9 Cyprus conflict and social capital theory

A new perspective on an old conflict

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This chapter brings a new perspective to the analysis of the Cyprus conflict. Borrowing from social capital theory, an attempt is made to revisit this long lasting conflict and to reinterpret the causes which have led to so many stop-go cycles of inter-communal negotiations. Building on the contributions found elsewhere in this book, a new analysis based on application of "bad" social capital theory shows that previously existing social capital between both communities was systematically destroyed (old trust, links and networks) and emerging new social capital disrupted (social capital built through peace-building efforts) by key power brokers of both communities as well as by third parties benefitting from disunion between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The chapter closes with an overview of measures which could be undertaken to rebuild social capital needed to make emerging cooperation be based on acquisition and maintenance of sustainable social capital.

Current developments

The election of Demetris Christofias on 17 February 2008 as new President of Cyprus was followed by a quick succession of meetings between him and Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat, president of de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC)[1] and by an equally speedy set of agreements and actions between both leaders to ease tensions between both Cypriot communities. Hopes are high that the two leaders will be able to break the impasse left after the paralysing results of the vote on the so-called Annan 5 plan for reunification on 24 April 2004 which was rejected by the Greek Cypriots by 76 per cent but approved by the Turkish Cypriots by 65 per cent paralysing the UN effort of reaching reunification before the official entry of Cyprus (whole island territory) into the European Union on 1 May 2004.[2] Since then, new initiatives have been tabled by the United Nations, supportive measures proposed by the EU and encouraging gestures extended by the US government but all in vain. The reunification process remained in impasse. However, judging by the speed of actions undertaken by both sides, cautious optimism is not unrealistic. The future will of course tell whether the signs of cooperation will hold when the road to reunification runs into predictable hard places.

Mr Christofias and Mr Talat met on 21 March 2008 and quickly decided to form six working groups and seven technical committees to move the reunification process forward. Specifically the following workings groups were formed: governance and power sharing; EU matters;, security and guarantees; territory; property; and economic matters. The seven technical committees consist of: crime/criminal matters; economic and commercial matters; cultural heritage; crisis management; humanitarian matters; health; and environment.[3] Both leaders nominated representatives, Mr George Iacovou and Mr Ozdil Nami, who meet on a regular basis, to work out the remaining issues. Compared to the stalemate and inertia since the inconclusive vote on the Annan 5 plan, the speed of working meetings and the general climate of courtesy and expressed mutual appreciation has been impressive, leaving many "Cyprus experts" astonished and in need of reconfiguration of established views and positions.

Christofias won against Ioannis Kassoulides, the former government's foreign minister by 53.36 per cent against 46.64 per cent in the second round. The former president Tassos Papadopoulos did not make into the run-off round. Kassoulides, a member of the right-wing party DISY, was in favor of the Annan 5 plan while the left-winger Christofias, leader of the communist AKEL party, was against it. This seemingly paradoxical behavior of voting "no" on the Annan 5 plan while now engaging in speed negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots might surprise but should be seen in the light of local politics. AKEL were coalition partners with DISY and both jointly rejected the Annan 5 plan.

AKEL, with their roots in socialist politics, much like the party led by Mehmet Talal in power on the Turkish Cypriot side, has always maintained ties with the Turks to the north. AKEL has been the driving force for unification for a long time. However, as AKEL has now formed a coalition government together with another right-wing party called DIKO, it will remain to be seen how the current Greek Cypriot government will be able to manage both negotiating for a settlement with the Turkish Cypriots while at the same time having to find an agreement which would be acceptable to their DIKO coalition parties and the Greek Cypriot citizens at large.

Whatever the agreement might be, it has to be acceptable enough so that a majority of the Greek Cypriots commit to it. This is no easy undertaking since about one-third are refugees from the north with claims for being given back property and land taken from them after the landing of the Turkish Army on the island on 1974 leading to the subsequent de facto partition of the island. In addition, the previous Annan 5 deal included other aspects which the Turkish Cypriots will not easily give up but which are impossible to accept for the Greek Cypriots, such as allowing a 20-year presence of Turkish troops and a scheme which consists of the Greek Cypriot taxpayers paying the money which would be give as compensation for land and property lost in the north. In other words, Greek Cypriots who lost land and property would have to pay themselves for the loss they incurred in 1974. This is a deal which is difficult, if not impossible, to sell to the Greek Cypriots. In other words, the challenges ahead are substantial, some say impossible, but both leaders appear determined to find a way out of the current stalemate.

Re-analysing the history of the Cyprus conflict

Cyprus is an island state of 788,457 people (July 2007 estimate).[4] Living with varying degrees of conflict ranging from violence to diplomatic manoeuvres since its independence in 1960, it has generated an astonishing amount of UN Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions. Starting from 1965, there are 17 UN General Assembly resolutions and as of 1964, one can count 89 UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP) had troops from various countries stationed along the green line, namely 4,500 from 1965 to 1968, and 3,500 from 1969 to 1972. There was an exceptional temporary increase to 4,440 for a period after the 1974 fighting and invasion of Turkish troops. Since 1990, about 2,000 UN soldiers are keeping peace on the island at a cost of about US$26 million per year.[5] The conflict at times flares up resulting in violence and death, including that of UN soldiers. A long succession of UN Secretary-Generals, elected heads of states, elected Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, as well as third parties like the UK, US and the EU, just to name the most prominent ones, have all attempted to solve the so-called Cyprus conflict, but none have succeeded.

The Cyprus conflict has attracted an enormous coterie of conflict scholars who all were either offering conflict resolution advice, peace-making suggestions or conducting training for officials from both sides with low levels of success.[6] While trying their best to bring about some form of conflict resolution, many also used their experiences to reflect on the seemingly impossible solution and wrote books, articles and advocacy type publications for the benefit of either side to the conflict, including this author himself (De Soto 2005; Diamond and Fisher 1995; Dodd 1998, 1999; Evrivriades and Bourantonis 1994; Evrivriades 2007; Evrivriades 2005; Fisher 1998; Fitchett 1998; Moran 1999; Palley 2005; Salih 1978; Saner 2001; Volkan 1979; Yesilada and Sozen 2002).

Other conflicts have an equally long or even longer history such as the Kashmir conflict, the Israel–Palestine conflict or the North–South Korean conflict. Still, for the size of the population at hand and the resources made available to first contain, then to solve, the Cyprus conflict, it remains a bit of a mystery why the conflict could not be solved either through reunification or through separation. The other conflicts cited above started with local armed conflict and later were changed to become a regional or international conflict as third party countries got involved in addition to the UN.

Involvement of third parties in the Cyprus conflict has not been discussed by conflict scholars. This author has written a first article on third party involvement looking at the Cyprus conflict from a multi-actor perspective (Saner 2007). Other scholars make at times allusions to third parties but mostly as an additional factor of their primarily bilateral conflict analysis.

In this regard, the comment made by President Christofias during the recent election campaign deserves closer attention. He stated, "We have a vision, we have a history of struggle and contact with the people in our efforts to reunify our country without foreign troops."[7] His comment can be interpreted several

ways. First, the most immediate target of his statement could be the Turkish troops stationed on the island, considered by the great majority of the Greek Cypriots to be an occupation army. However, he did not mention the Turkish troops by name. This could have been an omission or a diplomatic tactic to avoid making comments which could be seen as too aggressive towards the Turkish Cypriots with whom he wanted to negotiate (provided of course that he won the election).

An alternative interpretation would be that he meant the British forces stationed on the island. British forces were on the island before independence – Cyprus was a colony of the United Kingdom de facto since 1878, *de jure* since 1925.[8] When looking at the map of Cyprus below, one can see the location of the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). At one point they straddle the green line separating the Greek and Turkish Cypriot frontlines, one section going into the Turkish Cypriot area while another section of the SBAs is clearly within Greek Cypriot area at the southernmost tip of the island. In general, all of the SBAs are located in the southern part of the island facing the Near East across the Mediterranean.

Citing official UK information, the history and the current use of the bases can be summarized and cited as fellows:

> The Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) are sovereign British territory and cover 98 square miles of the island of Cyprus. The SBAs are purely military in nature. They are run by the SBA Administration and have their own legislation, police force and courts. They are very closely linked with the Republic of Cyprus with whom they are in a customs and currency union. Under the

Figure 9.1 Map of Cyprus (source: http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/cy.html).

> 1878 Convention of Defensive Alliance between Britain and Turkey, Britain took over the administration of Cyprus from Turkey, although Turkey retained formal sovereignty. In 1914, when Turkey entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, Britain annexed Cyprus. British sovereignty was recognised by Turkey under the terms of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and Cyprus became a Crown Colony in 1925.
>
> (Online, available at: http://www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/front?pagename=OpenMarket/xcelerate/ShowPagePc=Page&cid=1109176464204)

The official UK website does not explain in more detail the status of the SBAs nor how it came about that this territory was ceded in perpetuity to the UK at the time of independence of Cyprus in 1960. The process of negotiating the constitution of the independence of Cyprus remains murky and has been a contentious issue right from the beginning of the young republic, leading to disputes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as to the structure of government, the laws regulating the division of power between the two communities and the legitimacy of the SBAs ceded to UK in perpetuity.

The legitimacy of Cyprus ceding the bases ion perpetuity has not been discussed extensively in the conflict literature. Taking into account the military importance of the SBAs for the UK and US forces as a crucial link for military operations in the Near Eastern theatre e.g. in regard to Iraq, Syria, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Turkey as a refuelling base, overhaul and launching base of airborne reconnaissance and strike operations, it can be hypothesized that any effort at rewriting the constitution leading to a cancellation of the SBA special status would be resisted by the UK and the US. Because Cyprus is located in such a highly sensitive geographical region, involvement of third parties in the Cyprus conflict is not surprising since involvement on either side can also provide third parties with secondary gains for other conflicts outside or beyond the conflict on the island (Saner, forthcoming 2007).

When discussing the Cyprus conflict, the most frequent allusion is made to the inter-communal conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots going back to pre-independence times. However, due to the fact that three guarantor countries (UK, Turkey, Greece) have the constitutional right to intervene unilaterally if needed, the inter-communal conflict was immediately lifted up to the level of conventional war (e.g. Turkey's landing of troops on the island in 1974 leading to war with the forces of the Greek Cypriot government).[9] In addition, subsequent to the conventional war between official Cyprus and Turkey, the Security Council of the UN, following multiple resolutions passed by the US Assembly, gave a specific mandate to the UN Secretary-General and his office to create a peace enforcing group of UN soldiers to interpose themselves between both belligerent parties (green line) and to initiate diplomatic efforts which should lead to reconciliation and reunification.

From a conflict theory point of view, one could hence classify the Cyprus conflict as consisting of a bilateral conflict (Cyprus–Turkey) mediated by a third

party, namely the UN Secretary-General. The conflict is also influenced by multiple stakeholders including two remaining guarantor countries, Greece and the UK, and the EU as political supranational umbrella representing Greece, UK, Cyprus (Southern Cyprus) since May 2004, and all the other EU member countries. Figure 9.2 gives an overview of the multiple coalitions that have direct or indirect impacts on the outcome of any negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict, if ever achievable at all. Third parties to the conflict can either try to be constructive or help bring about a resolution of the conflict or they might be interested in using the conflict to obtain concessions elsewhere.

Several interest alliances are known to be influential in the region and linked to the Cyprus conflict. On the one hand there is configuration of countries tied to each other through various pacts and cooperation agreements ranging, for example, from cooperation in the military sector (Turkey, Israel, US) to alliance against a common enemy or competitor, e.g. Turkey and Israel together against Syria, Lebanon and Iraq (former Saddam regime). On the other hand, a very old alliance exists between fellow Christian orthodox countries such as Greece, with Serbia and Russia (formerly Soviet Union) against Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania and Turkey and a strategic alliance going back to the Cold War with Syria against Turkey and later on Israel (as an ally of Turkey).

Another link based on common interest and years of active cooperation exists between the UK and the US. The two bases ceded in perpetuity to UK are used for high-tech espionage work covering the Near East, the Black Sea and the Caucasus area. The airbase has been used during the Iraq War and is intended to



Figure 9.2 Constellation of Cyprus negotiations (source: Saner 2007. Reprinted with permission).

be at service for any other armed conflict situation. A fully reunited and harmonious Cyprus could question the legitimacy of the two bases and even ask the UK to retrocede them to the sovereign country of Cyprus.

The UN Secretariat has its own concern and tactical alliances. The Cyprus conflict has meant continuous expenditure, troop presence and fulfilling the mandate to be a conciliator of this old conflict. Having had to face increasing criticism, especially from the US and the UK, it is perfectly understandable that the UN Secretary-General would like to see an end to the Cyprus conflict. Not to find a solution means continued expenditures that are actually needed elsewhere. Also, not being able to find a solution represents the risk of negative public relations with third parties.

The alliance network depicted in Figure 9.2 is not exhaustive. It serves solely to illustrate the complexity of the Cyprus conflict and the obvious links to other interests that countries might have with each other or with other groups, and where a solution or the withholding of a solution on the island could be said to be in the best interest of these third parties but to the detriment of the two concerned communities. A classic case of such opportunistic use of conflicts is, for instance, the use of veto power by Greece to block internal EU and NATO decision-making processes. In opting for a negotiator's behaviour called "nuisance factor," third partiers can score points for their protégé (here Greek Cyprus) as well as use their blocking power to bar entry of Turkey to the EU until Turkey makes concessions in other domains.

It is unrealistic to expect a solution to the Cyprus conflict without a simultaneous package deal covering all the additional external conflicts described above. In other words, a solution to the Cyprus conflict necessitates a comprehensive solution covering the Cyprus conflict but also the other stakeholder interests and conflicts now so clearly linked to the Cyprus conflict.

Need to adapt social capital theory to the complexity of multi-actor conflicts

Resolving the Cyprus conflict would hence require a mix of interventions along the lines suggested by Chapter 12 in this book consisting of Track I conflict management by official negotiators and mediators. These parties approach conflicts from a rational choice position with the understanding that parties can win more at the negotiation table compared to continuing fighting or, in the case of Cyprus, upholding the status quo of a high-risk stalemate.

At the same time, Track II diplomacy could be used by encouraging civil society representatives of both sides to explore the underlying causes of conflict, and build trust and rebuild destroyed relationships. As suggested by Chapter 7 in this book, such an approach is promising along the lines of the women-for-women and Woman in Black (WiB) support groups working to re-establish ties with victims and representatives of other ethnic groups in Belgrade during and after the horrors of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. However, both Track I and Track II have so far failed in facilitating reunification in Cyprus for all the

reasons analysed elsewhere (Saner 2001). The Cyprus conflict is no longer a classic case of intra-national conflict (whether bilateral or multi-party local actors) but rather a multi-actor conflict with internal and external actors involved in causing the current conflict to remain in an impasse. Hence, it might be useful to enlarge the focus of analysis and make the scope of intervention more inclusive of the key external actors partaking in the Cyprus conflict either directly or indirectly namely the UK, the US, Greece, Turkey, the EU and the UN. The Cyprus conflict is no longer a matter between two communities that no longer trust each other and hence cannot agree to power sharing, but rather it is a matter of looking at the larger field of actors who actively play constructive or destructive roles in this multi-stakeholder environment.

Revisiting the multi-actor, multi-stakeholder Cyprus conflict from a social capital theory perspective

What follows is an attempt to look at the Cyprus conflict from a broader perspective than the habitual bi-communal perspective. By including third party actors in the analysis, a larger field is being created which lends itself to an application of some tenants of social capital theory allowing for a questioning of current mainstream Cyprus conflict paradigms mostly based on well-known assumptions of ethnic hatred. This is not to claim that ethnic distrust and even hatred between Greek and Turkish Cypriots does not exist.

After so many years of past violence and victimization of the other and more than 34 years of separation, personal relations and perceptions of the other (meaning here representatives of the other community) have become affected by a mix of remembered atrocities committed by both sides mixed with classic psychological processes of denigrating members of the other ethnic group.

Vamik Volkan, professor emeritus in psychiatry, and a leading scholar in conflict analysis of Turkish Cypriot origin with professional orientation and training in psychoanalysis, has followed the Cyprus conflict since its beginning. His classic publications (Volkan 1988, 1997, 2004; Volkan and Hzkowitz 1994) have been essential reading for understanding the complex psychological processes motivating Greek and Turkish Cypriots in their relations with each other. His latest publication (2008) ends on a pessimistic note observing that Turkish Cypriots have for too long internalized self-hatred and self-depreciation which originated from the way Greek Cypriots have treated them and hence are not able to defend themselves. Their identities remain weak and for that reason Volkan rejects the idea of "Cypriotness" often suggested by international NGOs who might be well intentioned but who are not aware of the less than secure self-identities of the minority Turkish Cypriots. For that reason, Volkan suggests continuity of separateness between both communities.

Looking back at both communities, self-identities fluctuated on both sides. Sharing the island on the basis of equality as human beings independent of ethnic background became increasingly difficult as the independence struggle intensified and British repression stiffened. The independence fighters were

almost exclusively Greek Cypriots who faced a good number of Turkish Cypriots who were hired by the British as police auxiliaries. This in turn did not help trust building in the build up towards independence. Matters got worse four years after independence when both communities were at loggerheads in regard to the constitution which was "agreed" in 1960, based on expert advice by the colonial overlord. The initial constitution assigned the presidency to a Greek Cypriot and the deputy presidency to a Turkish Cypriot with considerable veto power.[10] Further, constitutional provisions in regard to ethnically assigned seats in parliament made it difficult, if not impossible, to change the constitution thereby ensuring status quo in regard to the ceding of the SBAs to the UK.

The Greek Cypriots in power wanted to change the constitution while the Turkish Cypriot leadership resisted calls for constitutional change fearing that they would be relegated to a permanent minority position with little power to defend their interest. The stand-off lasted for the initial four years but then turned into violent conflict. As a consequence, and following the nationalistic leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community (the leading figure was Rauf Denktash, the later leader of the TC community), Turkish Cypriots were grouped together in self-defensive enclaves scattered over the island but mostly situated in towns and cities (see Figure 9.3). The newly formed enclaves were labelled as armed enclaves (Greek Cypriot leadership) or ghettos (Turkish Cypriot leadership).

Nationalists on both sides used the emerging divisions to consolidate power, eliminate opponents and force their respective communities into psychological

Figure 9.3 Areas where Turkish-Cypriots were forced to live in small ghettoes in Cyprus between 1963–74. (source: C. H. Dodd (1993) "Cyprus: A Historical Introduction," in C. H. Dodd (ed.) *The Political, Social, and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*, Eothen Press, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire, England. Online, available at: http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/breakdown.html Reprinted: with permission from Eothen Press).

bonding with each other. In that sense, social capital theory in the form of bonding (Woolcock 1998) bridging and linking was used to create separate identities. Mihaylova (2004) summarizes the three concepts as follows:

> Bonding social capital describes strong bonds between people such as family members or members of the same ethnic group; bonding social capital is good for "getting by" in life. Bridging social capital is characterized by weaker but more crosscutting ties for example between business associates, acquaintances, friends from different ethnic groups, friends of friends, etcetera The final form of social capital is linking social capital. This describes vertical (or hierarchical) connections between people in different positions of power.

From 1964 on, Turkish Cypriots were forced to live together in difficult and tight living conditions. Bonding was inevitable as a means to survive. Bridging to Greek Cypriots was suspended and sanctioned and linking was reorganized in the sense that the vertical connection now ended with Rauf Denktash, the leader of the TC community. A similar process occurred after the invasion of the Turkish army which resulted in 50 per cent of the Greek Cypriots becoming refugees who had to find new homes under often difficult conditions. Similar to Turkish Cypriots before them, the Greek Cypriots underwent bonding, bridging to TCs was suspended and the linking was redirected to the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community dominated by the nationalists.

One's sense of self identity is affected by the way others interact with one's self. Society with multi-ethnic composition is more vulnerable to lasting psychological impairment after having suffered violence and civil war. Rebuilding trust is very difficult after experience of armed conflict, war, hatred and open aggression or more hidden forms of denigration by representatives of the other community. If one adds to this a form of re-engineering of communities through resettlement, separation of living quarters and interposition of armies (here Turkish army and UN troops), social capital between both communities became progressively lost.

Looking from an historical perspective, and bearing in mind social capital theory, one can differentiate the following periods as having a bearing on intercommunal relations in the Cyprus conflict.

1 1960–3: rupturing of horizontal/inter-ethnic social capital between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

   Both communities lived in close proximity with each other, sometimes as direct neighbours in the same village, sometimes as one village of Greek Cypriots leading to a Turkish Cypriot village, etc. People of both communities either knew each other personally since childhood or were familiar with each other through trade and other commercial and social activities.

2 1963–74: consolidation of a split of vertical social capital due to power struggles between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership.

As the stalemate deepened between some of the leaders of both communities calling on one hand for constitutional change (Greek Cypriot nationalist leadership) and on the other hand for status quo (Turkish Cypriot nationalist leadership), tension increased leading to further tensions in both communities.

In both communities, power struggles were carried out between nationalist Greek Cypriots calling for ENOSIS (abolishing Cyprus as a state and integration of Cyprus into Greece) and others calling for maintaining independence and cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots (mostly leftist parties and trade union leaders).

On the Turkish Cypriot side a power struggle emerged between the nationalist Turkish Cypriots calling for TAKSIM (full separation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in fact partition and creation of two separate states) and those in the Turkish Cypriot community favouring cooperation with the Greek Cypriots and maintaining of an independent Cyprus. The latter were mostly leftists and trade union leaders.

Tensions within and between both communities increased further as violence and murders increased in and between both communities, and led to the creation of armed enclaves to which Turkish Cypriots retreated because of armed aggression by nationalist Greek Cypriot gangs or because of psychological pressure exerted on them by nationalist Turkish Cypriot leaders.

3 1974–present: continuous reduction of transversal social capital through consecutive interventions of third parties.

Both communities had to face multiple external interventions which reduced their ability to reach out to each other as well as to sources of support outside of Cyprus. The first intervention of magnitude was the *putsch* in 1974 organized by the Greek junta which aimed at the overthrow of the then president, Archbishop Makarios, seen as too close to the movement of the non-aligned countries and too dependent on AKEL, the communist party. The goal of the *putsch* was to take power and to integrate Cyprus into Greece.

The next intervention came about through the armed intervention of Turkey which sent its armed forces onto the island, which led to direct war with the Greek Cypriot forces and the Greek forces stationed on the island. Turkey pushed south in two attacks until it reached the current limits of the green line today patrolled by the UN forces (UNFICYP)

A third and so far most under-studied intervention was the non-intervention by the UK forces stationed on the island's SBA areas. Greece, Turkey and the UK were guarantors of the newly independent Cyprus. The three were all supposed to safeguard the integrity of the island's constitution and sovereignty. The UK chose not to intervene when the Greek junta launched the coup against Makarios and the UK forces did not intervene when the Turkish forces swept deep into southern parts of the island.

The choice not to intervene against the Greek or the Turkish armed aggression against Cyprus has been linked so far to anti-communist

considerations at the behest of the US, who was at that time involved in the Cold War. Related to this is the consideration that the UK and the US were and remain keen on keeping the SBAs extraterritorial, and hence a division between both communities ensures seemingly indefinite use of the SBAs important for military plans in the Near East theatre.

The result of all foreign interventions has been the same. Horizontal social capital is being lost, vertical power by new ethnic leaders gets to be consolidated, attempts to reach out to non-nationalist and non-aligned countries is contained, and the country remains split.

New attempts based on old bonding and re-enforced bridging, and attempts at recreating horizontal, vertical and transversal social capital

Many years were missed to create sufficient trust for reconciliation and cooperation, and many third parties have since entered the fray and turned the bilateral conflict into a multi-actor and multi-stakeholder conflict. The situation looks difficult and many Cyprus-watchers predict failure rather than success for the new Greek and Turkish Cypriot counterparts.

Social capital theory puts considerable emphasis on trust and civic participation (Putnam *et al.* 1993). Social capital is described as "those features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam *et al.* 1993: 167). In light of Volkan's observations and also taking into account the 34 years of failed attempts to create good-enough trust for both communities to agree on reunification, it appears difficult to envisage a successful new beginning by the new Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders.

There are indeed many current obstacles and lots of years of accumulated distrust and disappointment. However, there might be a real chance for both leaders to succeed. Both represent labour unions and have been in favour of reunification before. Both organizations have had difficult times to overcome. Members of AKEL were attacked by nationalist Greek Cypriot groups and the same was true for the Turkish Cypriot labour union whose members got persecuted by their respective nationalist extremists. Both new leaders might be able to rekindle horizontal social capital, even attempt some form of new and shared vertical social capital if both sides can agree on power sharing under a new constitutional arrangement.

Meeting the third factor of Woolcock's social capital linking will be more difficult, as it would include the possibility of new alliances and cooperation with other countries outside the traditionally assigned "father-motherlands" of Greece and Turkey, and traditional reference to third external parties such as the UK, US and the United Nations as extensions of Western power influence.

Whether both new leaders will be able to fend off their respective nationalist competitors within their respective communities and find enough resolve and strength to face powerful third parties like Greece, Turkey, the UK and the US is

not clear. Only time will tell whether they will be successful in creating a new Cyprus based on new social capital and social cohesion, that transcends old divisions based on nationalist identities and subservience to powerful third parties.

The UK, US, Greece and Turkey have in the past either openly favored repression of labor union leaders and leftists, or passively accepted human rights violations against labor union leaders and leftists on Cyprus, in Greece (e.g. during the period of the military dictatorship) and in Turkey (also during periods of military dictatorships). These common policies still hold strong despite the EU and the UN's repeated calls for reconciliation, which in itself could endanger the continued existence of the SBAs. The four powers could either try to make reconciliation between both sides difficult or use other influence tactics to prevent rapprochement between the two communities.

The alternative to this more defensive approach would be to contribute to new creation of social capital at horizontal, vertical and transversal levels, and requiring the four powers to willingly serve as partners rather than powers dictating terms. Still, a lasting peace and reunification could also be useful for regional stability and free up UN resources for other more urgently needed armed conflicts.

Notes

1 Distinction needs to be made according to *de jure* and de facto use of terminology. According to UN practice, the Republic of Cyprus is the legitimate government representing the whole of the island while the TRNC has been declared legally invalid by the United Nations (resolution No. 541 (1983) and No. 550 (1984)). The author acknowledges the existing legal distinctions but for the sake of clarity and editorial expediency, *de jure* and de facto titles and denominations will be abstracted to Southern Cyprus (controlled by Republic of Cyprus) and Northern Cyprus (controlled by Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), and titles of heads of governments simplified to leader of Greek Cypriots (Mr Christofias) and leader of Turkish Cypriots (Mr Talat).

2 The whole of the island is considered part of the EU. However, in the northern part of the island, in the areas in which the Government of Cyprus does not exercise effective control, EU legislation is suspended in line with Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty 2003. These areas are outside the customs and fiscal territory of the EU. However, Turkish Cypriots are considered as EU citizens. They are citizens of a member state, the Republic of Cyprus, even though they may live in the areas not under government control. In fact, many TC have applied for an EU passport and obtained it from the GC government authorities.

3 www.cyprusembassy.net/hoe/index.php?module=article, dated 27 March 2008.

4 http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/cy.html.

5 http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+cy0160).

6 See for instance: Marion Peters Angelica (1999) *Conflict Resolution Training in Cyprus: An Assessment*, a Fulbright Scholar assessment published in 1997. Online, available at: www.cyprus-conflict.net/angelica%rpt%20-%201.htm.

7 Online, available at: http://www.eurotrib.com/?op=displaystory;sid=2008/2/24/155427/427.

8 For historical and legal background on UK bases see: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1019233785265.

9 See Oezgür (2001).
10 For details of the intricate power sharing or better mutual power paralysis in case of non-cooperation see Drevet (1991), Weston Markides (2001), Oezgür (2001) and O'Malley and Craig (1999) as well as other scholars discussing the legal fine points of the Cyprus conflict. Even though some of these authors are more in favour of Greek Cypriot nationalist positions, it is nevertheless useful to consult them.

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