

External Stakeholder Impacts on Official and Non-Official Third-Party Interventions to Resolve Malignant Conflicts:

The case of a failed intervention in Cyprus

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
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ABSTRACT:

This paper focuses on the potentially positive and negative impact which multiple and competing external stakeholders (influential foreign powers, supranational institutions, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs from various countries) can have on official and non-official third-party peace building initiatives. The example selected in this article describes a Swiss NGO initiated inter-communal project on Cyprus. It analyzes the causes, primarily by external and to a lesser degree by internal stakeholders, which have negatively impacted this confidence-building project. The article is descriptive and narrative due to the fact that access to confidential information of key stakeholder governments and institutions remains limited. The aim of the authors is to use field experience to further develop theory and practice of official and non-official third-party intervention in a context of a persistent and malignant conflict characterized by multi-external stakeholder interferences, as is the case with the long-lasting conflict on Cyprus.

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Key Words: Cyprus conflict, external stakeholders, third party gains and sanction power, NGO-non state actor role effectiveness, interdisciplinary conflict resolution methodology.



AIM OF THIS ARTICLE

Attempts at finding peaceful solutions to this old and protracted conflict are legendary. While the authors wish this renewed “proximity talks” full success, we consider it nevertheless appropriate if not useful to reflect back on the reasons why all the previous attempts based on official third-party interventions by US, EU, UK or UN sponsored initiatives failed consistently since 1974. The same can be said of a multitude of non-official third-party interventions by various NGOs from different countries. The authors see an urgent need to discuss past failures in order to better understand the complexities of third-party interventions in the context of a malignant conflict and how a large number of external stakeholders can impact the process of peace making and peace building positively or negatively. It is hoped that a better understanding of the external forces intervening in such complex conflicts might help future third-party actors avoid a repetition of disappointment and deception. Twenty-seven years of failed negotiations are long enough to justify a more public debate about the usefulness of “proximity talks” by an official third-party actor like the UN as well as others including non-official third-party institutions such as the one represented by the authors. The new round of talks as well as the other non-official efforts can only benefit from a more open discussion instead of blindly believing again in the unproven magic of secret negotiations and expecting miracles from certainly well intended mediators who nevertheless have to cope with a multitude of “behind the scenes” players who are not subject to public accountability. The purpose of this article is to shed light on the complexity of the multi-party negotiations and to help further theory building in the field of peace negotiations.

PERSISTENT DANGER OF RENEWED ARMED CONFLICT ON THE ISLAND AND IN THE REGION

Armed conflict on Cyprus dates back to the early 1960s and the potential for a renewed conflict remains always a potential danger. The current tensions on Cyprus are complex since new conflicts have been added to the old list of issues, which have been festering since the declaration of independence in 1960. The current issues consist of political and military threats.

The first conflict is of political nature. The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus (RC) Cyprus is part of the countries which have been invited by the EU to start negotiations for full membership as of 31 March 1998. The Majority of the parliament of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), created in 1983 and recognised only by Turkey, voted against participating in the negotiation process.¹

Mr. Rauf Denktash, Turkish Cypriot leader, demands apriori recognition of full sovereignty by the EU of Northern Cyprus. Should he not get such recognition, he sees no purpose in participating in the EU negotiations and has consequently announced his intention to integrate the territories of Northern Cyprus into Turkey should the negotiations with the EU be undertaken in earnest. His proposed integration with Turkey is based on the reasoning of economic, political, military and

¹ Distinction needs to be made according to de iure and de facto use of terminology. According to UN practice, the Republic of Cyprus is the legitimate government representing the whole of the island while the TRNC has been declared legally invalid by the United Nations (Resolutions Nr. 541 (1983) and Nr. 550 (1984)). The authors acknowledge the existing legal distinctions but for the sake of clarity and editorial expediency, de iure and de facto titles and denominations will be abstracted to Southern Cyprus (controlled by Republic of Cyprus) and Northern Cyprus (controlled by Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), and titles of heads of governments simplified to leader of Greek Cypriots (Mr. Clerides) and leader of Turkish Cypriots (Mr. Denktash).

social symmetry.² Such a move would result in an open dispute between Turkey and the EU over the Northern Cyprus held territory should Southern Cyprus become part of EU territory. A direct dispute with Turkey is unacceptable to the EU since none of its member's territory should be disputed by other countries be they EU members or external to the EU.

The second conflict is of military nature.³ Russia has sold an anti-aircraft S-300 ground-to-air missile system to Southern Cyprus and planned to deliver the missiles in the second half of 1998. The missiles could reach targets in Northern Cyprus but also in southern Turkey including areas of Turkey which are currently the scenes of violent clashes between Turkey's armed forces and the PKK Kurdish separatist forces. The Southern Cyprus government planned to install the missile system in September 1998 unless Turkey would agree to demilitarisation of Cyprus or unless Mr. Denktash would drop his boycott of the UN talks on a settlement. Turkey and Northern Cyprus have made it clear that the attempt of delivering and installing these missiles would be immediately countered by air attacks and destruction of the missile depots on the Southern Cyprus controlled part of the island. Installing the missiles during the high tourism seasons and next to the British bases has added further risks to human life, Cypriot and foreigners alike, as well increased the likelihood of involvement of third parties, in this case of the United Kingdom and indirectly of the EU and NATO.

Concern about the likelihood of armed confrontations on the island and possibly between Greece and Turkey led to intense diplomatic interventions by the USA which has expressed "willingness to explore the possible creation of a no-flight zone over the island to head off the looming crisis".⁴ Giving in to intense political pressure, especially from the USA, president Clerides's government decided in close cooperation with Greece to have the Russian missiles be installed on the island of Crete in the near future rather than on Cyprus thereby deflecting the military threat put forward by Turkey.

The third conflict is of diplomatic nature. After the capture of the Kurdish leader Öcalan early 1999, Turkey accused Greece of having supported the Kurdish armed rebellion or as Turkey calls them "Kurdish terrorists". Greece was accused of having organised military training of Mr. Öcalan's PKK units and Cyprus was accused of having provided Mr. Öcalan and other PKK members with Cypriot passports and travel documents. Both accusations have been denied by Greece and Cyprus although documents presented by the Turkish government seem to indicate some cooperation between the Kurdish PKK movement and Greece and Cyprus.

² Symmetry would mean equal moves by both sides, that is economic and political integration of Southern Cyprus and EU versus Northern Cyprus and Turkey, military cooperation between Southern Cyprus and Greece versus Northern Cyprus and Turkey, social integration (e.g. free movement of people) between Southern Cyprus and Greece/EU versus Northern Cyprus and Turkey.

³ Perceived threats to their survival by both communities is based on the following arguments. Seen from Northern Cyprus, the current troops strength of SC (Southern Cyprus) outnumbers the combined forces of NC (Northern Cyprus) and Turkey by 2:1 and is approaching a 3:1 ratio which Turkish officials consider sufficient to wipe out an enemy during a land based battle. Should the missiles be installed, Turkey might not be able to send troop reinforcements via airborne units to counter the perceived military dominance of the combined SC and Greek troops. Seen from a SC perspective, the missiles are needed in order to guarantee safety in case of war since the Northern and Turkish armed forces are believed to be better equipped than the Southern and Greek armed forces, and since Turkey refuses to accept de-militarization (zero option) of the island and since the Turkish coastline is near and Turkey's army is larger in number and better equipped than the Greek army, the only ally which Southern Cyprus can count on in case of armed conflict with Turkey.

⁴ Report titled "Cypriots Now Trained for Missiles", source Reuters, published by International Herald Tribune, 10 July 1998.

In light of growing tensions in 1998, several EU countries have appointed special Cyprus envoys who visited the island last year. For instance a Swedish and a German envoy visited Cyprus early March 1998. The US is equally worried about the increasing tensions and has sent former Under State Secretary Richard Holbrooke as representative of President Clinton to Cyprus on 3 April 1998 to hold talks with leaders of both communities. His mission failed and a second mission early May 1998 failed as well. Attempts by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to bring both sides back to the UN negotiation table also failed at the end of March 1998 in Geneva. Mr Denktash wants as a precondition for rejoining the UN negotiations that the UN Security Council rules that Cyprus cannot negotiate entry into the EU until Greeks and Turks on the island reach a settlement and until Northern Cyprus gets full recognition as an independent state (Buchan, 1998), a ruling which is highly unlikely since the Security Council already ruled in 1983 against the proclamation of the TRNC⁵ and since France and the United Kingdom, being EU members and members of Security Council, would most certainly veto any attempts by the Security Council to make pronouncements concerning the EU.

Armed conflict is again possible which would not only pitch Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots but most likely Greek against Turkish army units on Cyprus and possible on Greek and Turkish territory thus possibly igniting a larger regional conflict. Taking into account the already existing armed conflicts in the region and the traditional alliances between Greece, Russia, Serbia and Syria on one hand and Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Israel on the other hand, it is evident that any armed conflict on Cyprus should be avoided. The question is and has been for many years, how could the conflict on Cyprus be avoided and how could the two communities be brought to a peaceful cooperation and co-habitation.

THE CYPRUS CONFLICT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: A FEW KEY POINTS

What follows is an attempt to summarise key points in the recent history of Cyprus in order to help the non-informed reader better understand the intricacies and complexities of this long lasting conflict. The authors do not pretend to present an objective account of conflict nor do they think they can render justice to the multitude of views of the persons and communities directly involved in this malignant conflict. This summary should therefore only be seen as an approximate overview of the recent history of Cyprus. Relevant statistical data pertaining to economics, military strength, population etc. are presented in Annexe A.

The island state of Cyprus gained its full independence from Great Britain in 1960 after negotiations involving Greek and Turkish foreign ministers in Zurich in 1959 and after tripartite negotiations at the London conference in 1960. Turkey agreed to drop claims for partition of the island (TAKSIM) and Greece accepted to drop its support for unification of Cyprus with Greece (ENOSIS). The Treaty of Guarantee provided Greece, Turkey and Britain with the power and authority to intervene unilaterally, if necessary, in order to safeguard the a) the independence, b) territorial integrity and c) security of the Republic of Cyprus and also d) the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. To guarantee security, British forces were stationed on the British held military bases, which according to the 1960 constitution have been ceded in perpetuity to Britain by the newly independent Cyprus. At the same time garrisons of 650 Turkish and 950 Greek troops were stationed on the island to represent the interests of the other two guarantor powers.

⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 541, 18 November 1983

The new country's constitution provided for an executive power, which rests with a directly elected Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president with veto powers. Legislative powers rest with the House of Representatives, consisting of 80 deputies elected by proportional representation. Only 56 Greek Cypriot deputies have currently taken up seats in parliament. The Turkish Cypriot deputies have been absent since 1963 and absent is also the seat of the Turkish Cypriot vice-president due to the fact that the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from government in 1963 after the outbreak of treaty violence. Since all government buildings were located in the Greek Cypriot controlled part of Nicosia making, Turkish Cypriot members of parliament and government officials stayed away for fear of their lives. A return to their respective functions was not possible since both sides could not agree on the conditions of renewed co-operation.

At the time of declaration of independence, Cyprus counted 619 villages of which 393 were wholly or predominantly Greek-Cypriot, 120 were Turkish-Cypriot and 106 were classified as mixed. The populations of both communities were spread widely over the island. For the purposes of local administration, the island was divided into six districts, corresponding to the six towns. After the 1974 war and armed intervention of Turkey and the swapping of populations across the green line, the provinces became divided along ethnic lines of demarcation. Famagusta and Kyrenia are located in the area now protected by units of the Turkish army and the Turkish Cypriot armed forces. The capital, Nicosia is divided into a Turkish and Greek Cypriot part while Limassol, Larnaca, and Paphos are now protected by the Greek Cypriot army supported by units of the Greek army.⁶

The constitution of the newly independent Cyprus was drafted in such a way that neither community could fully dominate the other. Constitutional change based on simple majority, theoretically possible by a full "Greek Ethnic vote", were not possible since constitutional changes had to be approved by both communities separately. While the carefully drafted constitution provided for veto rights and guaranteed representation in administrative functions for the Turkish Cypriots, it prevented on the other hand an efficient functioning of government since every administrative measure was complicated in its execution and demanded excellent cooperation between the representatives of both communities. This cooperation was not easy due to old animosities, fears and historical distrust. State administration became difficult to handle and a constant source of frustration for the Greek Cypriots who wanted a stronger unitary and independent state free and the freedom to choose its international alliances which created a lot of fear on the side of the Turkish Cypriots who constantly perceived the Greek Cypriot leader as trying to limit their power. Hence, their reaction to requests by the Greek Cypriots for constitutional changes were met with obstruction and legalistic constitutionalism which in turn exacerbated the frustration of the Greek Cypriots who felt paralysed by a constitutional frame which many considered an imposition by Britain, their former colonial ruler.

An attempt by Archbishop Makarios, first elected President of Cyprus after independence, to propose 13 drastic changes to the 1960 constitution led to inter-communal violence in December 1963⁷. Further violence followed including punctual interventions by Turkish and Greek army units on the side of the respective ethnic communities. The violence led to UN Security Council resolutions and the creation of a UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). A January 1964 conference in London did not generate a solution to the problems nor was Mr. Galo Plaza, the UN appointed

⁶ The Turkish names for Kyrenia, Famagusta and Nicosia are Girne, Gazimagusa, and Lefkosa.

⁷ Seen from the Southern Cypriot perspective, the changes should have made the government more efficient while the Northern Cypriots saw it as a premeditated attack on their communities with the goal of full subjugation and acceptance of constitutional changes which would have resulted in full domination by the Greek Cypriots.

mediator, able to bring about a resolution of the conflict in 1965. The conflict festered on and violence reoccurred at intervals. The Cyprus conflict was kept alive due to the inability of the leaders of the two communities to come to a compromise solution. The situation was further complicated due to the financial and military support being provided by Turkey and Greece for their respective ethnic communities. In addition, Makarios' active role in the non-aligned movement brought Cyprus in the eyes of the USA dangerously close to the Soviet Union, which was at that time making inroads in the near East. In addition, Britain was worried about a possible loss of its bases should both sides come to an agreement and the USA saw ENOSIS with a positive eye as long as it drew Cyprus closer to Greece, a NATO partner and at that time perceived as being ideologically closer to US foreign policy and a more reliable partner than Cyprus.

A decisive and fatal moment for all of Cyprus occurred in 1974 when the Greek junta orchestrated a coup led by the Greek Cypriot Nicos Sampson against the government of Makarios who had to go into hiding. Greek Cypriot followers of both groups engaged in violent street battles for the control of the island. Seeing the Sampson's forces win the contest and understanding the aim of the coup as being directed towards the integration of Cyprus into Greece (ENOSIS) and constituting a direct threat for the encircled Turkish Cypriots, Turkey demanded that Greece dismiss Sampson but the request was not heeded by the Greek junta leaders. An appeal by Turkey to Britain to make use of its rights as guarantor and to intervene to re-establish the conditions of the Treaty of Guarantees was also unsuccessful. Seeing no alternative, Turkey decided to use its authority as Treaty guarantor and to intervene ⁸militarily in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots. On 20 July 1974, Turkish troops landed on the island and engaged the Greek Cypriot army in battle. Sampson's government fell and Glafkos Clerides acted as President until the return of Makarios. At a conference of the Guarantor Powers, Greece, Turkey and Britain met in Geneva on 25 July 1974 and agreed on a new cease-fire. However no agreement could be reached in regard to political arrangements. Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots demanded a bi-zonal federal state whilst the Greek Cypriots insisted on the re-establishing of conditions based on the 1960 constitution. A stalemate reigned until Turkey presented a proposal on 13 August based on the establishment of 6 cantons giving the Greek Cypriots 36 Hours to respond. On 14 August, Turkey launched a second round of military operations seizing 37% of Cyprus territory, which they control up to today.

A new cease-fire was brokered by the United Nations and supervised by the UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), a Peace keeping force of around 4400, today 1180, troops who are since patrolling the Green Line with a mandate to keep the two sides from engaging in violent acts. In addition, the UN offered its good offices to conduct intercommunal negotiations with the goal of bringing about reunification of the island through peaceful means. An estimated 160'000 Greek Cypriots and 50'000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees, thousands of people died and disappeared. Under the auspices of the United Nations, populations moved across the island creating a predominately Greek Southern and Turkish Northern Area divided by the cease-fire line or Green line manned by UNFICYP.

During two high-level negotiations in 1977 and 1979 the two communities agreed to take steps towards restoring the political unity of the Cypriot state agreeing that the basis for a settlement should be the setting up of a bizonal federal republic. However, the talks did not make sufficient progress and were stopped when Mr. Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriots, unilaterally

⁸ Both sides describe this situation differently namely as "intervention" by Northern Cyprus and Turkey based on the legal argument that Turkey had a unilateral right and obligations based on the 1960 constitution and as "invasion" by Southern Cyprus and Greece based on the argument that Turkey has violated international law by not having withdrawing its forces from Cyprus making frequently comparisons between the Cyprus conflict and for instance the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces.

declared an independent state in 1983 in the occupied zone which was and remains only recognised by Turkey.

Negotiations resumed in January 1985 under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar who urged the two sides to agree to a settlement proposed by the UN. The participants at that meeting were Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, who became the leader of Southern Cyprus after the death of Makarios in 1977, and Mr. Denktash. However, the talks collapsed almost immediately, ostensibly over procedural differences but in reality because of key disagreements over substantive issues. Mr. Denktash insisted that the two sides immediately sign a UN draft settlement plan sketching out the constitutional and territorial arrangements for a bizonal federal state and then relegate all outstanding issues to joint working groups.

Mr. Kyprianou countered that the draft failed to address issues considered vital to a workable settlement by the Greek Cypriots - namely Turkish troop withdrawal, guarantees for a settlement, and arrangements regarding the right of movement, property ownership and settlement within the state. He called for negotiation on these issues before agreeing to sign any of the tabled documentation. The negotiations failed because of disagreements over substantive issues but also due the fact that the negative personal chemistry that developed between Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash did not generate sufficient trust nor willingness to cooperate.

Gaps remained on three major issues: the time sequence of Turkish troop withdrawal and the establishment of a federal government and whether Turkey should retain the right to intervene as "guarantor", and whether citizens of a federal Cyprus could travel, settle and own property throughout the island. For the Greek Cypriots, testing the Turkish Cypriots' intentions on the "three freedoms" was the best way to determine whether Mr. Denktash was sincerely interested in a federation. Mr. Denktash dismissed however the Greek Cypriot emphasis on the three freedoms as propaganda, aimed at brandishing him as intransigent and uncompromising.

Mr. Denktash stated that he could accept the three freedoms in principle, subject to "regulation" by his zone of the proposed federation. Freedom of movement could be implemented immediately if the Greek Cypriots would in effect forgo freedom of property by accepting financial compensation for homes lost in 1974. After an exchange of property rights (taking into account Turkish Cypriot property in the south), further Greek Cypriot settlement in the Turkish Cypriot held zone would be subject to the Northern Cypriot government's approval. The Greek Cypriots countered that refugees should be offered either restitution or compensation and that arrangements could be made to ensure that the Turkish Cypriots could secure political control of their zone. Both sides reached again stalemate.

New attempts were made to settle the differences at the negotiation table but all meetings ended again in failure. While this went on the political landscape of the South-Eastern Mediterranean region changed. In 1989, Papandreou's Socialist Party was defeated by Mitsotakis' conservative New Democracy party. Mitsotakis subsequently became the new Greek Prime Minister. In Turkey, Prime Minister Özal was elected President of Turkey and Denktash was re-elected president of Northern Cyprus in 1990. The gulf war in early 1991 strengthened links between Turkey and allied forces of the USA, U.K. and France and the collapse of the Soviet Union opened the way for closer relations between Turkey and the Turkic speaking Republics in Central Asia and in early 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali replaced Perez de Cuellar as new Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Further changes on the political landscape included Turkey's renewed request for closer ties and eventual membership in the European Economic Community and recognition by Ankara that a

Cyprus settlement would facilitate this process of gradual approximation towards the EU. Both sides were persuaded to drop previous preconditions and to come again to the negotiating table. The Greek Cypriots no longer insisted on advance discussion of the three freedoms, although they stressed that their resolution was the core of any settlement.

At the beginning of the 1990ies, Mr. Denktash no longer insisted that the Greek Cypriots accept a March 1986 version of the 1985 UN draft settlement plan as a basis for accepting any negotiations. He referred instead to UN documents prepared in 1980, 1981 and 1984 which included elements regarded as positive by the Turkish Cypriot side, such as noting that freedom of movement in the proposed new state must be decided upon bearing in mind certain "practical difficulties."

A new attempt was made in July of 1992 to come to a solution during UN-chaired talks in New York. The talks, however, failed again and were broken off on 14th August. When the talks began in July it was understood that if they failed, the Cyprus issue would automatically be handed over to the Security Council. The United Nations has been stationing troops on the islands since 1974 and was getting tired of binding financial and military resources on the island which were needed urgently for peace keeping missions elsewhere in the world. An agreement was reached to start talks again in New York on 26 October 1992.

On the other side, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, and the government of Turkey rejected both the UN "Set of Ideas" and the UN map as well as negotiations within the framework of the "Set of Ideas" since they were seen as a surprise fait accompli by the office of the UN Secretary General which was accused of not having obtained previous approval by Turkey and Northern Cyprus as was the customary practice. There was a perception on the Northern Cypriot side that this "horse trading" (Dodd, 1998) of making concessions in regard to return of land and withdrawal of Turkish troops in exchange for constitutional rights were too vague and to much of a sacrifice of basic principles in regard to recognition of Northern Cyprus and the security needs of the Turkish Cypriot community.

In October 1994, five informal meetings were held in Nicosia in the presence of Mr. Gustave Feissel, the UN Secretary's Representative with both leaders to find ways to unblock the discussions around the CBMs and "Set of Ideas". Some progress was made but both sides appeared to be moving out of sink, while one was focusing on the CBMs, the other focused on elements of the "Set of Ideas".

Relations between Greece and Turkey deteriorated again seriously in late August 1998 with the main tensions being centred around the possible instalment of a Russian S-300 missile system on Southern Cyprus considered an aggressive act by Turkey to be matched by equal aggression. Turkey threatened with war in case Southern Cyprus would go ahead with the planned installation of Russian S-300 missiles. The missile crisis led to interventions by the US and the EU and was finally resolved by a backing-down of Clerides. The missiles were finally installed on Crete instead of Cyprus.

A deterioration of the climate could also be detected by a letter⁹ addressed to Mr. Clerides by Mr. Denktash in March 1998 stating that he is breaking off inter-communal talks completely until

⁹ An example of the tension, animosity and tactical manoeuvring between the two leaders can be gathered from the way the letter was supposed to be exchanged. It is reported that Mr. Denktash addressed his letter to Mr. Glafkos Clerides without title signing instead with his own name and title "President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". The letter was sent to Mr. Clerides via the UN representative who had it be sent back unopened. Copies of the letter were simultaneously sent to third parties by the administration of NC to make sure that the content would become

Northern Cyprus reaches full political symmetry, meaning is internationally recognised and until both sides acknowledge their mutual existence. Mr. Denktash announced the end of the federation idea while at the same time proposing ways to improve the tense atmosphere on the island by solving key issues such as security, compensation for lost property, and guarantor rights through negotiations on a bilateral basis. When declaring the independence of Northern Cyprus in 1983, Mr. Denktash left a door open for negotiations through the good offices of the United Nations. This door appears now closed. The only positive note is his suggestion that once both sides would have improved their relations, the idea of forming a confederation could be taken up provided the trust between both sides were more positive, an assumption which seems further removed than ever from reality taking into account the many years of armed conflict and the continued deterioration of trust.

While the stalemate continued on the island, the motherlands experienced instability. Both Turkey and Greece underwent major changes which in turn have affected the Cyprus conflict. For instance, Turkey has seen four governments since the death of President Özal in 1993. Turkish Prime Ministers changed from Tansu Ciller, Necmettin Erbakan, Mesut Yilmaz to currently Bulent Ecevit. Erbakan was forced to resign by the secular Turkish military leaders who are at the same time entrenched in their intent to win the war against the Kurdish guerrilla. Yilmaz had to resign due to accusation of corruption charges. Ecevit survived as Prime minister after the 2000 elections but in a weakened power position since his party had to agree to power sharing coalition government with the strengthened nationalist party.

The only new development is the election of Necdet Sezer as 10th President of Turkey on 5 May 2000. Necdet Sezer is the first Turkish president who has neither a military nor a political background. His previous function as president of the Turkish Constitutional Court and his outspokenness, especially in regard to Turkey's need to honour the Human Rights Convention of the Council of Europe, might lead to improved relations between Turkey and the EU and indirectly to a greater willingness of Turkey to entertain new solutions to the Cyprus conflict. This will have to be seen in the near future. On the other hand, Greek Prime Minister Simitis only narrowly won the elections on 9th April 2000. His PASOK party defeated the opposition party New Democracy (ND) by 43,8% against 42,7%. The narrow victory weakened Simitis' political power which in turn might weaken as well new efforts at improving ties with Turkey undertaken during his previous government's mandate.

THIRD PARTY CONFLICT INTERVENTION: DEFINITION OF TERMS

The conflict on the island of Cyprus has festered over many years and has consistently been close to a dangerous flare-up. Many attempts at finding solutions to this conflict have failed, be they based on official or non-official third-party interventions, setting the challenge for current efforts under the auspices of the United Nations.¹

This article describes a failed attempt at non-official third-party intervention by the authors under the auspices of a Swiss NGO during the period of 1992 and 1993. At the time, tensions and the political and military stakes were not as high as they are today. Funding for the proposed intervention was secured; however, the project was never launched because of a multitude of external stakeholder objections and lack of active support despite earlier promises of cooperation. The details of the failed project and the reactions by external stakeholders are analyzed below.

public. At the same time, the way it was done, added insult to injury to an already low trust situation filled with hatred and disdain.

Borrowing from Douglas H. Yarn's (1999) dictionary of conflict resolution, third-party intervention is defined as

Intervention into a dispute by a person or agency whose purpose is to act as an instrument for bringing about a peaceful settlement of the dispute, or by an actor who is not a direct party to the crisis. The purpose of the intervening action is to facilitate resolution. (pp. 414)

Third-party interventions can be undertaken by an official organization or institution, e.g. a national government, an inter-governmental organization such as the United Nations, or a supra-national organization such as the European Union. On the other hand, third-party interventions can also be proposed by non-official organizations such as NGOs (non-governmental organizations), be they profit oriented (e.g. consultancy firms) or not-for-profit (e.g. foundations, faith-based organizations, religious groups etc). Cyprus has seen both official and non-official third-party interventions (see Dodd, 1999).

Conflict theory as proposed by Morton Deutsch (1949) postulates that knowing how people believe their goals are related is a useful way of understanding the dynamics and consequences of interaction between disputants. Building on Deutsch, Tjosvold (1998) states that goal interdependence may vary depending on how individuals interact, which in turn affects outcomes. Beliefs about how goals are related substantially affects expectations, communication, problem-solving methods and productivity. Deutsch identified three alternative goal interdependencies: cooperation, competition and independence. With cooperative goals, people want each other to perform effectively, for such competence helps each person involved in a conflict to be successful. In competition, people believe their goals are negatively related and that they are better off when the other party acts ineffectively. Independence occurs when people believe their goals are unrelated.

The behavior of both sides to the Cyprus conflict relates to competitive interdependence, certainly not cooperative interdependence nor independence, even though each side acts as if it can survive independently of the other. The costs of continued conflict, including heavy defense spending, are high, leading to a highly inefficient allocation of resources and increased dependency on third parties for support. These costs should provide an incentive to cooperate, but the investment in mutual opposition has affected both sides' judgment and sense of identity. Identity on both sides is based on the existence of a perceived enemy across the Green Line. Cooperation would necessitate a process of mourning, of letting go of the deeply held hurt and anguish, and of making space for a new beginning so eloquently described by Vamik Volkan (1979).

Reconciliation could be possible, reunification under some form of guaranteed autonomy even desirable, provided ethnic pride and arrogance could be forsaken for Cypriotism (Salih, 1978). Cyprus before de facto partition in 1974 was a state which was ethnic yet purported to be democratic (Rouhana, 1998). Creating new states after colonial rule requires re-definitions of national identity between majority and minority groups. Kelman (1997) and Zartman (2001) suggest that national identity itself must be "negotiated"--explored and discussed--with those who are affected by the groups' self-definition. Such a negotiation around a common identity did not occur. Cypriotism by definition would exclude *enosis*, the unification of Cyprus with Greece as supported by Greece, and *taksim*, the partition of the island as supported by Turkey. Rather, it would imply the creation of a new identity with non-exclusionary characteristics, similar to arrangements in Switzerland whose official name in Latin is "Confederatio Helvetica," a concept of nationhood that transcends the multitude of contemporary linguistic and religious divides.

Civilian or unofficial third-party based interventions have grown in popularity over the last 20 years and the range of intervention techniques and experts have increased considerably. Some of the interventions are based on diplomacy applied to civilian peacekeeping efforts, also called “Track Two diplomacy” by a former US diplomat Montville (1991) or “multi-track diplomacy” by Diamond and McDonald (1991). Both terms indicate a range of unofficial contacts between citizens or groups outside of governmental systems.

Social scientists have made their own contributions to the growing field of non-official third-party intervention and developed handbooks for the resolution of conflicts (Burton 1987, Mitchell and Banks 1996). Some have created a Crisis Magnitude Index based on an International Crisis Behavior database (Ben-Yehuda, Sandler, 1998). The problem, however, with this field is the extent of complexity involved which demands a high interdisciplinary scope of thinking but often times results in an amalgamated mixture of intuitive leaps and systematic methods, leading to confusion of approaches. In his critique of the field, Rouhana (1995) suggested that more needs to be done to make the underlying hypotheses more transparent, the working methods more explicitly based on conflict theory and the selection criteria regarding third-party qualifications more based on professional standards.

Responding to criticism about unofficial third-party intervention, Saunders (1995) stated that the world today needs a larger array of effective instruments to address the deep-rooted human conflicts and to avoid miring them in a narrowing academic debate. He further stated that no one program would achieve peace by itself. The impact should consist of combining complementary approaches. Saunders concluded

Some things only governments can do, such as negotiating to commit large groups. Some things citizens outside government can do better, such as probing the human dimensions of conflict and changing relationships among groups enough to permit formal mediation and negotiation or resolution of conflict by other means.

The questions which remain unanswered, particularly in light of the many years of failed third-party interventions on Cyprus, are two-fold, namely:

- a) What should come first, changing the human dimensions through psycho-social understanding (great majority of previous non-official third-party interventions tried this strategy in Cyprus) or changing the context of the relationship between the parties of a conflict through, for instance, joint economic activities (as tried by the authors and described below in this article)?
- b) What is the impact of external stakeholders’ influence on third-party interventions, especially in a situation of persistent conflict where internal stakeholders manipulate the motives and potential incentives and sanctions available to external stakeholders?

THE INTER-COMMUNAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION PROJECT ON CYPRUS 1992-1993

In 1990-1992, after looking at the long list of failed attempts of official and non-official third-party interventions (see Diamond & Fisher, 1995; and Dodd, 1998), the authors thought that most approaches and instruments of traditional conflict resolution methods had been tried and that both sides appeared more entrenched than ever before. Official UN conciliation efforts were practically stalled and ineffective,² as also appeared to be the case with official third-party attempts by the UK, the EU, and the US who seemed to indulge in their own diplomatic efforts without any evidence of acting in concert themselves. Although non-official third-party interventions by NGOs

from the UK and the US focusing on improving cross-cultural understanding and problem solving appeared to have improved relations of a select group of Greek and Turkish Cypriots who jointly participated in seminars organized by the US based “Cyprus Consortium”¹⁰³(see also Dodd 1998, 1999), still no substantive resolution of the conflict was in sight. Cyprus was as disunited as ever, looking like a malignant conflict with all the potential for a new flare up of armed hostilities. Peacekeeping was guaranteed by the presence of UNFICYP troops but without peace-making nor sustained peace-building, the cease-fire could break should the equilibrium be lost due to internal or external changes.

All previous attempts at solving the Cyprus conflict had failed and progress on the UN-brokered “Set of Ideas” for reconciliation was stalling. Previous discussions with the EU regarding economic cooperation were still not acceptable for both sides because of their linkage to a political settlement. The authors, therefore, considered it imperative to be pragmatic and to propose confidence-building measures that did not immediately trigger off the political sensitivities of both sides. The basic idea, grounded in conflict theory and social science, was to create projects in the economic sphere that would offer mutually beneficial incentives to both sides. The proposal was based on the assumption that a Swiss NGO could provide a neutral arena in contrast to the UN auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations who was at different times seen as being biased by either one of the two parties or sometimes by both for different reasons,⁴ or to a UK- or US-based NGO because of their affiliation or perceived allegiance to their respective governments who were in fact actively intervening as behind-the scene external stakeholders. The authors hence concluded that only a new approach which had not been tried before could succeed—the involvement of both sides’ economic interests in order to develop sufficient common ground for future inter-communal cooperation. What seemed possible was a non-official third-party intervention which would not jeopardize the ongoing political efforts of the UN. The key to success would be to side-step the political big picture discussions and to focus instead on common economic interests of both communities. If the economic cooperation project succeeded, both sides would gain sufficient confidence to tackle the more complex political issues at a later stage.

As a first step, the authors constructed a simulation based on the Cyprus conflict. All known issues were listed as well as the possible options to solve each of the separate conflict items. The simulation was subsequently used by the authors during training seminars with European diplomats in order to find out which of the issues could be solved by both parties with the least resistance and highest degree of success, and which ones demanded more time and more established confidence of both parties. Eight such seminars quickly confirmed that the political issues were too contentious and too loaded with negative historical meaning, but that a cooperation project based on economic objectives would provide economic incentives for both parties without triggering off intractable political issues.

As a second step, the authors reviewed their notes of a successfully completed consulting project that they conducted in Nicosia for the Geneva-based International Labor Organization (ILO). The aim of the ILO project was to find productivity improvements with the staff of the Industrial Training Authority in Cyprus (government agency of Southern Cyprus).⁵ The consulting assignment brought out economic opportunities that both communities could pursue without necessarily having to wait for a political settlement, such as agriculture (e.g. pest control, food processing); banking (e.g. off-shore financing and management consulting); infrastructure (e.g. construction of inter-communal energy, water and sanitation infrastructure); labor (e.g. utilization of skilled labor and low-cost labor pools for joint production); medical services (e.g. hospitals, medical

treatment, training, education); tourism (e.g. niche markets, entertainment, conferencing); and transportation (e.g. shipping, air transport, port facilities).

Commercial projects aiming at joint small enterprise initiatives that could bring together representatives of both sides' business communities seemed like a viable idea especially if such joint Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SME) projects were to be situated on the Green Line, thereby offering easy access to citizens from both sides.

As a third step, the authors held initial talks with Mr. Theocharides, at that time head of the Small Enterprise unit of the ILO in Geneva and former government official of the Southern Cyprus government, and with Dr. Vamik Volkan, Director of the Health Sciences Center of the University of Virginia, an American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst of Turkish Cypriot origin, to check whether this initial idea also appeared viable to both of them. Both men responded positively to the idea of creating business-related initiatives with partners close to both sides' chambers of commerce, as long as it did not involve top level governments officials who would inevitably have to defend their well-known political positions, which had made any mutually acceptable solutions impossible up to that point.

As a next step, the authors visited representatives of both sides of Cyprus in the summer of 1992 to conduct a fact-finding mission in order to assess the viability of their project idea. The responses were positive and therefore Swiss government officials were contacted to see whether basic funding for such a project would be available. The response was positive as well and an initial fund was promised under the conditions that a) the UN officials in charge of reconciliation on Cyprus would be informed and the idea seen as complementary to their peace efforts and b) another important country involved in solving the Cyprus conflict would support the author's initiative financially and operationally.

Finally, the authors looked for ways to get political and economic support from the main trading partners of both communities. It was hoped that the EU and US would be interested in supporting the joint Greek-Turkish Cypriot SME project by providing financial incentives in the form of favorable tariffs for jointly produced goods, technical know-how in terms of sector specific experts and financial support for the administration of the project. Also expected were political support from the UN Secretariat in charge of Cyprus and technical support from UN agencies such as UNDP (United Nations Development Fund) who were already active on the island.

Building on these initial commitments, the authors wrote a project proposal, which they presented to various parties in 1992 and 1993 in New York, Washington, Brussels, London, and Geneva and to representatives of the two sides of the island for funding or for political support.

RESULTS OF CONTACTS MADE

What follows is a description of the key points made during the discussions held with various stakeholder institutions. The various meetings were organized through the Swiss Embassies and missions in the respective countries.

Representatives of the *Cyprus Chamber of Commerce* (CCC) in Nicosia were very much interested in the project proposal. Similar ideas had been discussed within the Cypriot government and business circles, and a few areas of cooperation continued to exist despite the ongoing hostilities and separation, such as the sewage system, which dated from pre-hostility times and was still functioning across the Green Line at Nicosia, and some cooperation in regard to irrigation and electricity. Greek and Turkish Cypriots were crossing daily into the British bases as laborers and that further use of the barren space on the Green Line could be envisaged. In closing, the CCC

was interested in the project but made it clear that the funding would have to be ensured before further steps could be undertaken.

Representatives of the *Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Industry* (CTCI) in Lefkosa/Nicosia were also interested in the project but stipulated that the participation of Turkish Cypriot business people would be contingent on the support of their government. The consultants were told that participation would be useful for the Turkish Cypriots provided that they would be treated as equals and that the UN would support the project. Economic advisers close to Mr. Denktash gave a similar response.

Representatives of the *UN Secretary General* in charge of Cyprus expressed great interest in the project. They were aware of the potential peace dividend that such a joint economic project could generate and promised support. Rather than maintaining communication with the authors, however, the office of the UN Secretary General subsequently developed a similar project under its own auspices calling it Confidence Building Measures (CBM). The project was presented to the US government who subsequently gave it its political and institutional support.

Representatives of the *EU Commission Division DG-1* in charge of EU-Cyprus relations responded at first with suspicion. They stated that they tried their hands at peace-making in Cyprus for many years and doubted the value of the project. They declared that the EU had its own vision and would not want to be involved in third-party initiatives. In addition, they thought that the UN reconciliation effort was on track and that the Association Agreement with Southern Cyprus should not be jeopardized. While they stated that they would not be against the project, the authors could not count on active support from the EU commission.

Representatives of the Cyprus desk in the Office for Southern European Affairs of the *State Department* responded positively to the project proposal, and promised to look into financial support that might be available through payments to UNDP or directly from US sources. They also mentioned that US experts were already involved in conflict resolution workshops on the island and in the United States.

Representatives of the Middle East Program at the *Royal Institute of International Affairs* (RIIA) in London and advisers to the UK government declared their interest in the project and described initiatives of the UK government and RIIA on the island.

The representatives of the *United Nations Development Program* (UNDP) office in Nicosia, which co-ordinated the UNDP/UN program on Cyprus, expressed interest in the proposal and stated that the inter-communal project could offer useful economic benefits to both communities while providing confidence-building experiences that in turn could help the UN conciliation effort. As experts in project design and development economics, they expressed willingness to provide UNDP support for the project, provided it would be politically acceptable to both communities and the office of the UN Secretary General.

Initial contacts were also made with representatives of the *Turkish and Greek governments* through their Geneva- and Berne-based missions and embassies. However, realizing the lack of support from the external stakeholders mentioned above, no attempt was made to further develop relations with representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments.

ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE RESULTS OBTAINED

The project did not become operational for various reasons. It could be said that the time was not ripe for such an inter-communal project since each party involved was still trying to “win,” which

by definition was unacceptable to the other party. Waiting until both sides had exhausted their hopes for victory might have been a more appropriate strategy for the introduction of this project. While timing is of importance, the authors estimated that waiting any longer would only lead to more entrenched positions. Looking at the current renewed confrontations, it seems that the question of appropriate timing was not the key cause of failure.

From a position of Realpolitik, one could indeed say, “Don’t force cooperation if there is no will to cooperate,”--in other words, the international community should allow the opponents to be separated from each other and to accept the inevitable dividing up of Cyprus into two distinct and independent states. While this seems to be the solution preferred by many Cyprus experts, at the time of the project proposal it did not seem that all efforts were tried yet and that the will towards reconciliation was not yet exhausted. On the contrary, it seemed that the majority of the citizens of both communities favored reconciliation, not separation.

But the cause that contributed most to the failure of this inter-communal effort can be found in the mutually paralyzing attempts by too many external parties who tried and continue to try to influence the members of both communities according to their own strategic design. Little has been written so far on the destructive impact of competition between external and internal parties and institutions who are all stakeholders to the conflict, but who at the same time cannot cooperate among themselves. Their competition often leads to confusion and dangerous instability since they at times try to manipulate the two side’s officials and populations, while at the same time they also become the victims of manipulations by either sides’ officials and opinion leaders. Following Saunders’ (1995) premise of ensuring complementarity between governmental and citizen approaches to conflict resolution, one could state that the project was not sufficiently linked to the parallel efforts by governments and inter-governmental institutions, particularly by the UN Secretary General, the US and the EU.

A) Interferences due to contradictory strategies of key external stakeholders:

There were too many competing initiatives and schemes by the main powers involved in the Cyprus conflict. Some of the competition pertained to conflicting strategies with the EU favoring membership of Cyprus and an exclusion of Turkey, coupled with demands that Turkey should change key policies e.g. in regard to its human right records and treatment of the Kurdish minority.

On the other hand, the US seemed to favor a freezing of the status quo as a form of de facto partition based on mutual deterrence and balanced military capability of Turkey and Greece--a form of frozen military build up⁶ similar to the Cold War stalemate which subsequently led to arms reduction agreements between NATO and the Warsaw pact countries.⁷ Other conflicting strategies were due to institutional rivalries for leadership between, for instance, the UN Secretariat General and the London-based think tanks close to the UK government.⁸ Other forms of competition can also be assumed due to personal career ambitions and professional jealousy of the key actors involved.

B) Interference due to local stakeholder prerogatives

In addition to all of the above reasons, one should not underestimate the forces at play on the island itself. Both communities are economically better off than their respective mother countries. GNP/capita is \$8,210 for Greece (1995, UNDP) versus GDP/capita of \$14,000 (1997) for Southern Cyprus, and GNP/capita for Turkey is \$2,780 (1995, UNDP) compared to \$4,800 GDP/capita for Northern Cyprus (1997). Any unification would mean a potential loss of prosperity for the two respective “sons” of the two motherlands. Economically speaking, it is therefore in the best interests of both parties to keep the conflict alive and keep funds from the mother countries flowing in.

In addition, any unification with their respective mother countries would lead to a loss of political status for many servants and politicians of Southern and Northern Cyprus who would not only possibly lose their jobs but would also most likely no longer be in the limelight of international media coverage. The need for negotiations in New York, Brussels, Washington, London etc. would fall away and so would the need for embassies, missions and representative offices with all their staff and professional career officials. Clearly, institutions seek to perpetuate their own survival and avoid extinction. A continuation of the conflict, as long as it does not get out of control, guarantees the survival of both sides’ bureaucracies.

C) Interference due to alliance tactics of external stakeholders

From a regional perspective, one should also acknowledge the both longstanding alliances and affinities and those which have developed over the last twenty years. The political and religious links between Russia and Greece go back for centuries. The new military cooperation between Turkey and Israel is more recent but can be seen in the light of the age-old maxim: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Allusion is made here to the conflict regarding water rights and support to the Kurdish rebels by Syria, a historical enemy of Israel and an ally of Russia, while Israel and Turkey have been allies of the US. Solutions to the Cyprus conflict that appear to be in favor of any alliance can trigger resistance by the backers of either Southern or Northern Cyprus.

An excellent example of how alliance tactics and geopolitical considerations impact US-Turkish relations surfaced during the debate on whether to adopt a measure condemning the mass killings of Armenians in Turkey 85 years ago and to label the killings as genocide. The following excerpt is very telling and worthy of being quoted in full since it describes both external alliance considerations as well as internal stakeholder influence on US foreign policy decisions.

Minutes before the House was to vote on a measure condemning the mass killings of Armenians in Turkey 85 years ago as genocide, Dennis Hastert, the speaker, withdrew the resolution, citing President Bill Clinton’s warning that a vote could harm national security and hurt relations with Turkey, a NATO ally. In a telephone call late Wednesday and in a letter Thursday, Mr. Clinton urged Mr. Hastert to withdraw the measure, saying it could inflame tensions in the Middle East, embolden President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and interfere with American efforts to stabilize the Balkans. In addition, Turkey had threatened to ground American warplanes that fly out of Turkish air bases to patrol northern Iraq, and to cancel a \$4.5 billion deal to buy 145 attack helicopters made in Texas. Mr. Hastert had promised Representative James Rogan of California that he would bring the resolution to a floor vote. The measure is a top priority in Mr. Rogan’s Southern Californian district, which

has the largest Armenian-American constituency in the country (International Herald Tribune, 2000).

Similar considerations about alliance tactics are also relevant for other external stakeholders having particular interests in the region in general and hence indirectly being cautious about the possible repercussions that the Cyprus conflict might have on their respective geopolitical interests.

D) Interference due to historical distrust of main conflicting parties

The animosities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots are based on both the recent memories of violent conflicts on the island and one-sided “historical” accounts of atrocities committed by Greeks and Turks alike. These partial historical accounts offer enough ammunition for Greeks and Turks to justify their mutual distrust. Both sides tend to omit accounts of atrocities committed by their own (Boatswain, Nicolson, 1989).

Without concrete steps towards cooperation, conflicts fester and old mistrust prevails. “History is at the root of the Cyprus conflict, seriously hindering policies of reconciliation” (Dodd 1998, 7). A standing proverb regarding the Cyprus conflict states that the Greek Cypriots cannot remember what they did to the Turkish Cypriots while the Turkish Cypriots cannot forget what the Greek Cypriots did to them during the period of 1955-1973. To this one has to add that the Greek Cypriots and Greeks in general cannot forget what the Ottoman Turks did to their ancestors nor do the Turkish Cypriots and Turks remember what their Ottoman rulers did to the Greek minority during the centuries of Ottoman rule.⁹ A historical regression analysis of this kind could include an account of what the Byzantine rules did to their Turkish vassals, what the Trojans did to Greeks, ad infinitum. Such historical analysis always leaves one side short and ready to even the score with the other side: a hopeless and fruitless undertaking, albeit understandable, but unacceptable in our age of globalization, interdependence and regional integration. There are plenty of skeletons tucked away in Greece and Turkey concerning alleged atrocities committed by either side on the other over the last seven hundred years. However, what is continuously, often deliberately, forgotten by both sides are the equally abundant stories of harmonious relations and successful cooperation between Greek and Turkish citizens.

E) Interferences due to the use of the “Cyprus card” for secondary gains elsewhere

At the moment, it seems that the Cyprus conflict offers too many incentives for too many parties to continue the conflict rather than to find ways to solve it. Both communities reap benefits from the protracted crisis, be this in terms of subsidies or other favorable economic treatment. Both sides can also use the conflict for secondary political gains at the UN, with the EU and the main nuclear powers (US and Russia). Greece and Turkey have tried with different degrees of success to do this, both in relation to the EU and the UN as well as in regard to other countries in the Balkan and South Eastern Mediterranean region. To bring about peaceful cooperation on Cyprus might jeopardize these potential secondary gains as well as upset many strategic schemes so dearly held by foreign policy officials of key countries and by a long list of “Cyprus experts”.

F) Interference due to competing agenda of institutional stakeholders

1. The United Nations Secretariat

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the Security Council, which backed the “Set of Ideas” (Security Council Resolution 750, 10 April 1992) as an appropriate basis for reaching an overall framework agreement, had neither the means nor the will to impose it. With both sides

responding negatively to the “Set of Ideas,” the Secretary General’s office, with strong support of the US government, proposed a set of 14 Confidence Building Measures (CBM) (UN, 1993) to find ways to persuade both sides to cooperate in order to prevent the negotiation process around the “Set of Ideas” from breaking down completely. The goal of the CBMs was to find ways for both sides to undertake some form of economic cooperation which, if successful, would create good will and confidence on both sides to continue and ideally conclude the negotiations around the “Set of Ideas”. Examples of such economic cooperation would have centered on cooperation on water problems, development of joint commercial projects, re-opening of Nicosia International Airport and Famagusta port facilities, including the possibility of the UN acting as a kind of “neutral free zone agent” in the interest of both parties. The idea for these CBMs as well as the initial list of topics were suggested by the authors to Gustave Feissel, then Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in New York on 30 January 1992 and to Tom Wukitsch, official in charge of Cyprus desk, US State Department, Washington on 9 February 1992.

However the related UN project failed as well. The reasons for the failure of the UN-sponsored CBM are linked to the fact that the UN General Secretariat had to simultaneously pursue its “Set of Ideas” and observe the multitude of Security Council resolutions which were seen by the representatives of Northern Cyprus as being biased in favor of Southern Cyprus. At the same time, representatives of Southern Cyprus could not easily separate the CBMs from the larger picture of the “Set of Ideas,” fearing that any compromise on CBMs could negatively impact the “Set of Ideas”. For example, giving in on CBM issues would be interpreted as an indirect recognition of sovereignty of Northern Cyprus.

2. The United States

It was not clear whether the US would press the Turkish government to lean on Northern Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. Both President Clinton - as a presidential candidate - and his secretary of state, Warren Christopher, repeatedly said that the Turkish army must leave Cyprus. But that has been common coin. Stronger pressure on Turkey was not part of US realpolitik since the Americans needed Turkish permission to use air bases from which they wanted to protect the Kurdish people of northern Iraq.

The authors contacted the US State Department at a later stage to further clarify US support for their project. Instead of promised support, the authors were told to contact USAID, which in turn clarified that it was not interested in “unsolicited proposals.” The reasons for this response became clear soon afterwards: USAID developed its own project for Cyprus and the terms of reference specified that experts should be US nationals.

Being invited to play an active role by the UN secretariat, the US took a proactive role. The first three months of 1993 were spent discussing and negotiating the CBMs in New York and on Cyprus. A meeting in Vienna was also organized on the initiative of the United States, bringing together representatives of the UN Secretary General, Northern Cyprus, Turkey and the US to discuss issues pertaining to landing rights for the Cyprus Turkish Airlines in light of the re-opening of the Nicosia International Airport. The CBM negotiations seemed to make sufficient progress but ultimately failed. The cooperation regarding Nicosia airport and Famagusta/Varosha port brought to the fore issues pertaining to indirect recognition of Northern Cyprus--for instance, in regard to the involvement of Turkish Cypriot police and administration which was unacceptable to many decision makers of Southern Cyprus.

3. The European Union

The EU has been torn by at times opposing strategies of some of its member countries in regard to EU relations with Turkey and both sides of Cyprus. Notable disagreements exist between, for instance, Greece, the UK, France and Germany. One example is the decision by the European Court of Justice on 5 July 1994 in favor of Southern Cyprus in regard to certification of export products, thereby overruling the previous UK practice that allowed Northern Cyprus to export directly to the UK market.

EU impact on the Cyprus conflict also became apparent when the European council confirmed in Cannes (1995), Madrid (1995) and Florence (1996) that Southern Cyprus would be among the countries considered for the next EU enlargement, despite objections from Northern Cyprus and Turkey. Having obtained the agreement by the EU to start membership negotiations with Southern Cyprus 6 months after the intergovernmental conference in Maastricht in 1996, Greece dropped its objection against an EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement, which became operational on 6 March 1995. However, Turkey was infuriated by the decision taken at the EU summit in December 1997 in London not to include Turkey on the list of countries for future membership. Hakki Muftuazade, London Representative of Northern Cyprus, stated, "Under the international Cyprus settlement of 1959-60, Cyprus cannot become a member of any organization of which both Turkey and Greece are not members." Hence, EU membership of Cyprus without simultaneous EU membership or candidacy of Turkey is not acceptable to Turkey and Northern Cyprus. Mr. Muftuazade further commented: "[any] suggestion that the EU should appoint an honest broker to mediate between the sides cannot be taken seriously. The EU, by considering the unilateral application of Greek south Cyprus for membership, has acted partially. It has violated the international Cyprus settlement, and has thus become a party to the dispute." In conclusion, the EU is seen as being biased in favor of Southern Cyprus by the representatives of Northern Cyprus in a similar way as the UN.

4. The United Kingdom

The Royal Institute of International Affairs, a think tank close to the UK government, continued to organize special workshops and informal high level meetings in London for representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. That the results were as negative as ever before may be due to the fact that both communities mistrust UK intentions for historical reasons. Further attempts to play a leading role in the Cyprus conflict during the UK presidency of the EU in 1998 ended in failure despite high level leadership of the UK government. In addition, any agreement between both Greek and Turkish Cypriots could lead to a new constitution which in turn might lead to a cancellation of the British bases which have been ceded to the UK in perpetuity under the provisions of the old constitution.

G) Interferences due to bilateral tensions between Greece and Turkey

Both countries have been at war with each other previously and continue to experience bilateral tensions that have brought them close to renewed armed conflict, whether originating on Cyprus or elsewhere in the region.

Turkey supported Bosnia during the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession and offered political, economic and military alliances to Albania and Macedonia while Greece sided with Serbia and vehemently opposed any international recognition of Macedonia. In addition, the unexpected death of Turkish president Özal on 18 April 1993 led to new political frictions and uncertainties in Turkey. Turkey was already under pressure from the Kurdish rebellion in the east of Turkey; the

armed conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an ally of Turkey; and the unstable situation in the Central Asian Republics, where Turkey is competing with Iran for regional dominance.

Foreign policy in regard to Cyprus and the EU has important internal domestic repercussions for Turkey, which fears that any apparent weakness vis-à-vis Greece, the EU, and Southern Cyprus would be exploited by political opponents inside of Turkey. Hence, to act strong against perceived hostile countries also scores points against internal opponents. Turkey has also had to live with difficult rejections. The first was the threat in April 1995 by the Council of Europe to suspend Turkey's membership as long as its human rights record was not improved. The second rejection came in December 1997 with the EU's council of ministers' decision not to include Turkey on the list of possible future EU member candidates.

With respect to Greece, change came with the death of Papandreou in July 1996, which led to the election of Kostas Simitis as new Greek Prime Minister. Relations with Macedonia have been tense, and even tenser with Albania, a perceived enemy of Serbia. To be seen as being weak on the Northern Cypriots and too soft on Turkey could reactivate nationalistic feelings. These sentiments could in turn re-ignite *enosis* activists, who could then cause hostilities between Greece and Turkey to flare up again, as has happened in the past, leading to suffering, destruction and economic waste on all sides considered.

Greece and Turkey have seen their bilateral relations deteriorate over the last two years. A crucial confrontation over the Aegean island Imia/Karda in January 1996 was only avoided thanks to strong intervention by the US. Military maneuvers continue to be organized close to disputed islands with increased danger of accidental collision of naval vessels and fighter planes. The territorial disputes over the delimitations of international waters between Greece and Turkey remain unresolved and Greece continues to successfully block the full implementation of the customs union between the EU and Turkey, especially in regard to the implementation of the attached aid package in favor of Turkey. Greece dropped its opposition to the conclusion of a customs' union with Turkey in 1996 in exchange for the acceptance by the other EU members to put Cyprus on the list of the next group of candidates for EU membership. This was coupled with a firm time frame to start membership negotiations by March 1998. Another attempt was made to bring the leaders of both communities closer together in Les Diablerets near Montreux/Switzerland in August 1997. However, this attempt failed as well and the conflict remains at a stalemate as ever before.

H) Interferences due to competition between local leaders

Greek Cypriot leaders have long competed among themselves for power. Dealing with the "Northern enemy" has inevitable consequences for local politics. Political adversaries turn any perceived weaknesses of the incumbent government in dealing with Northern Cyprus into a political handicap [or Achilles' heel].

In February 1988, George Vassiliou defeated former president Spyros Kyprianou in the presidential elections of Southern Cyprus. Vassiliou, a self-made millionaire businessman, entered Cyprus politics promising to find a solution to the Cyprus problem without being the leader of an established political party. He was the main supporter of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's "Set of Ideas," as a possible solution to the island's troubles. President Vassiliou accepted the plan as "a basis for a settlement;" since then, though he denied it, he had helped to work it out. In February 1993, by a tiny margin of 50.3%, the Greek-Cypriots voted Vassiliou out of office. His successor as president of Cyprus was a veteran right wing politician, Glafkos Clerides, who called the plan merely "a basis for negotiation."

The Democratic Party, which supported Mr. Clerides in the second round of voting, rejected the plan altogether. So did the Greek Orthodox Church. Both groups held the opinion that the plan would not lead to a federal, bi-zonal, bi-communal state, as was claimed, but would rather lead to a binary state dominated by the Turkish Cypriots. It was seen as being based on an "unfair" notion

of "political equality" between the 18 % Turkish minority and the 82 % Greek majority, giving the "Turks" veto power on all important decisions of the government and parliament.

Former presidents and politicians remain active in the political arena, causing positive and negative consequences for the leadership in power. For instance, former president Kyprianou flew to Belgrade on 9 April 1999 stating that he would try to obtain the release of three captive US soldiers, suggesting that "NATO could reciprocate by responding to the numerous international appeals for a cease-fire, at least over the Orthodox Easter weekend" (WSJ, 1998). His attempts at peace-making between NATO and Serbia are certainly laudable, but possibly also motivated by the fact that Serbia, Russia and Greece have been the key backers of the Greek Cypriot government and by his goal of retaining political influence in Southern Cyprus.

Turkish Cypriot leadership struggles have been won by Rauf Denktash on a continuous basis since the de facto split of the island subsequent to the intervention of Turkey's armed forces in 1974. While being re-elected several times as president of his self-proclaimed Republic, he nevertheless had to accept the election of a Prime Minister who was not a member of his own political party.

Faced with opposition by the left-leaning labor party, Denktash has consistently used his influence with the Turkish government, be it left- or right-leaning, to counter internal opposition to his leadership and to neutralize criticism of his negotiation tactics with the Greek Cypriots. He has also been able to mobilize the substantial weight of the Turkish settlers from Anatolia and the Turkish soldiers stationed on the island against internal challengers who are mostly Cyprus-born politicians.

THE BASIS OF STALEMATE IN LIGHT OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

Competing external and internal stakeholder interferences can paralyse official and non-official third-party intervention or seriously limit its effectiveness no matter how sophisticated the intervention method and strategy might be. As long as strong external stakeholder interests prevail, third-party interventions are bound to fail or be of limited value. It is useless to blame the conflicting parties for lack of "political will" as has been suggested in the chapter on Cyprus by the United Nations (1996: 167). The closing chapter summarizes the UN-led efforts to reach lasting peace between the Greek and Turkish communities by suggesting:

If all concerned manifest the necessary political will, a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem is within reach.

As long as external stakeholders, such as the European Union, Turkey and the USA, which hold and apply considerable incentives and sanctions, take key decisions affecting Cyprus a resolution of the intercommunal conflict cannot be expected under current conditions. To highlight the external competing contradictions, the decisions by the EU parliament regarding Cyprus' application for membership are quoted below and contrasted with statements made consistently by the Northern Cypriots and representatives of Turkey.

(2000)[The EU Parliament] welcomes the decision taken by the European Council at Helsinki not to make a solution to the Cyprus question a precondition for accession, urges the Turkish Cypriots to join the delegation of the legal Government of Cyprus, unconditionally, in negotiating the accession of the island to the European Union, since the Turkish Cypriot community will be able to enjoy the benefits of membership once the political question of Cyprus is resolved.

[The EU Parliament] deplores the lack of goodwill on the part of the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey to make progress with the negotiations on the question of Cyprus towards a settlement on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and with the future constitutional arrangements.

*[The EU Parliament] calls on the European Union, through its High Representative, to become more involved in the search for a solution to the Cypriot question and calls for the final political settlement to respect the *acquis communautaire*.*

(The EU Parliament) believes in this respect, that projects involving the two communities should be instituted and dialogue between the parties encouraged in a new framework of confidence building measures.

From a Northern Cypriot perspective, these positions have been discussed and rejected countless times. Most un-initiated readers, however, might not know the basic contrary position. Summarizing Dodd (1999: 315-323), key divergent views are, for instance a) Turkish Cypriots see no reason why they should not be treated as equal to the Greek Cypriots, as they were in 1960 when both sides agreed, as equal communities, to the 1960 Constitution setting up the Republic of Cyprus; b) Turkish Cypriots do not want to be treated as a community while the Greek Cypriots are recognized as a state, particularly as a state with authority over them and c) The UN declares itself to be neutral but in fact supports the economic embargo on Turkish Cypriots.

While the Southern Cypriot Government is supported by the EU application process and resolutions as depicted above, the Northern Cypriots look to Turkey. In presenting the proposal for a lasting solution on Cyprus at a press conference on 31 August 1999, Denktash stated:

As a final effort to achieve a mutually acceptable lasting solution in Cyprus, I propose the establishment of the Cyprus Confederation based on the following arrangements:

- 1. A special relationship between Turkey and the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) on the basis of agreements to be concluded.*
- 2. A special relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration on the basis of symmetrical agreements to be concluded.*
- 3. Establishment of a Cyprus confederation between TRNC and GCA (Greek Cypriot Administration)*
- 4. The 1960 Guarantor System shall continue*
- 5. The Cyprus Confederation may, if parties jointly agree, pursue a policy of accession to the EU. Until Turkey's full membership to the EU, a special arrangement will provide Turkey with the full rights and obligations of a EU member with regard to the Cyprus Confederation.*

These positions by Denktash have been recently reiterated by Hilmi Ozkok, Turkish Land Forces commander, who visited Northern Cyprus end of January 2002 to command a plan exercise of Turkish troops on the island. General Ozkok stated that he rules out "unilateral Greek Cypriot EU accession"...and expects that the new "heart to heart talks" initiated mid-January 2002 between Denktash and Clerides would

“produce a mutually acceptable settlement which ought to be a “new partnership state” of the two states on the island, and that the “new partnership state” on the island would include “two sovereign states”¹⁰ .

These strong words were echoed by Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit who threatened to integrate Northern Cyprus into Turkey should the EU give Cyprus (Southern Cyprus) full EU membership while still holding claims to sovereignty covering the whole island.

The tough talk by Turkish officials and commanders is on one hand a reiteration of known Turkish and Northern Turkish negotiation positions. However, other motives are part of the tough stance of Turkish leaders. Turkey has been working hard on making political and economic reforms required for EU membership. In October 2001, the Turkish Parliament passed 34 of 37 proposed amendments to the 1982 Constitution to bring it more in line with European Union standards.¹¹ If Cyprus (Southern Cyprus) is accepted into the EU by 2004, Turkey would be faced with a situation whereby its own future EU membership application could be vetoed by Southern Cyprus since EU membership decisions are taken by consensus. Southern Cyprus as a new EU member could hence block Turkey's EU ambitions indefinitely, an unacceptable possibility for Turkey's political and economic leadership.

At the same time, the US government's anti-terrorist campaign is resulting in increasing pressure on Turkey to cooperate in the eventuality of possible military actions against Iraq or even Iran. Such an eventuality worries Turkish leaders since a possible defeat of Iraq might lead to an independent Kurdish state in the northern part of Iraq. Turkish political and military leaders fear such an eventuality: An independent Kurdish state might re-ignite Kurdish rebellion in Turkey and even more worrisome might lead to new calls for Kurdish separation from Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey does not want to be seen as obstructing the US campaign against “evil powers”.

Tensions are further kept high due to the continued threat of Southern Cyprus to install the S-300 PMU-1 Missile System bought from Russia which, if installed on the island, would alter the current military balance and possibly threaten Turkish airspace including parts of Turkey inhabited by its Kurdish minority unhappy with its status and treatment by the majority Turkish government.. Southern Cypriot authorities promised to withhold the installation of the missile system but not to relinquish its right to do so at a later stage.

The stalemate due to competing external stakeholder interests continues despite the highly publicised “heart to heart” talks between Denktash and Clerides. Positions of Turkey, Greece, Southern and Northern Cyprus have hardened, not softened, and the risks of a regional war (Iraq, Iran) is further adding risks to the already tense conflict. In addition, the deadline for EU membership of Southern Cyprus adds further stress to all parties concerned. It is hard to imagine a solution to the Cyprus conflict without a simultaneously negotiated deal including Turkey's future EU membership, Southern Cyprus' need for security and a sustained pacification of bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey.

Taking into account the continuously looming danger of new flare-ups of violence, be this on the island or between Greece and Turkey, continuous peace-making by the UN and peace-building by non-official third parties will remain a necessity as stated below:

One possible disadvantage, as the experience in Cyprus illustrates, is that sometimes the international community must be prepared to stay for extended, perhaps even indefinite, period of time (Carnegie Commission, 1997: 65).

It is unrealistic to expect a solution to the Cyprus conflict without a simultaneous package deal covering all the additional external conflicts described above. In other words, a solution to the Cyprus conflict necessitates a comprehensive solution covering the Cyprus conflict but also the other stakeholder interests and conflicts now so clearly linked to the Cyprus conflict.

NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTIONS IN RESOLVING MALIGNANT CONFLICT INFLUENCED BY EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

Malignant conflicts such as the long-lasting one on Cyprus where external and internal stakeholders form a myriad of possible coalitions mutually paralysing each other or, even worse, defeating constructive moves towards a settlement, manifest a lack of a clear “border line” in regard to identifiable bargaining space. The “front line” constantly shifts from micro-meso-macro-level negotiations to multiplex negotiations involving different sets of internal and external stakeholders. A possible comparison in the arbitration and negotiation literature is the concept of multi-stranded or polycentric disputes first introduced by Lon Fuller (1978) and further developed and discussed by Alan Rau (1999).

The idea is that in order to resolve them, the adjustment of a number of different issues is required, and the resolution of any one particular issue necessarily in turn affects every other issue.

Related to the idea of “polycentric disputes” of multi-stakeholder conflicts is the concept of “porous boundaries” first applied to change management of UN agencies (Saner, 1996; Saner and Yiu, 1993). Changing UN agencies is similar to facing a polycentric dispute with an additional complication based on the porousness of boundaries which makes it difficult for an agent of change to deal with the inevitable resistance. The reason for such difficulties lies in the fact that UN agencies experience continuous changes in their external environment, which are further compounded by the reactive or even proactive flux of their internal environment. This makes UN agencies an especially challenging place for leadership and management control. Any intervention in such a volatile environment has to face many forms of open and subtle resistance. Small successes give rise to a consultant's premature celebration but in the long run, failure is the most common outcome. Overall, the task of conducting change intervention in UN agencies can best be characterized as “Sisyphonian.”

In order to deal as effectively as possible with the polycentric nature of malignant-multi-stakeholder conflicts and the porousness of their boundaries, the following prerequisites might help create a sufficiently stable environment conducive for constructive conflict resolution efforts by third parties, namely:

- a) Key backers of both sides of the Cyprus divide have to believe that it would be in their best interest to give third-party intervention a chance rather than to sabotage it. This of course presupposes that key players to the Cyprus conflict see reconciliation and cooperation as being not only in the interest of the two communities, but also in the backers' own strategic interests. As long as key external and internal stakeholders continue to use the Cyprus conflict for secondary gains, no third-party intervention will be successful, since the payoffs of the status quo outweigh the potential gains through peaceful coexistence.
- b) Success of third-party intervention in general and for Cyprus in particular requires incentives, sanctions and the clear message from key external stakeholders that win/lose strategies will not be honoured. Political sanctions and incentives should guarantee the continuation of the status quo until a mutually acceptable solution can be found. Clear messages should be

signalled to both sides and their respective backers that neither EU membership of Cyprus nor integration of Northern Cyprus into Turkey are acceptable solutions as long as both sides do not come to a mutually acceptable solution albeit only a minimalist solution.

- c) The corollary to the political side is economic sanctions and incentives. The main market for both sides is the EU. Goods and services produced jointly by Greek and Turkish Cypriots should be given preferential treatment and in addition be supported by adequate developmental subsidies. As long as either side sees a possibility to cause discrimination against the other side's products, the strategy of win/lose will continue and confrontation will be the dominating motivation.
- d) Complex conflicts such as the long-lasting conflict on Cyprus encourage initiatives from many institutions, some well intended and some self-serving. Key stakeholders, be they countries or supra-national institutions such as the UN, try to put forward their own peace-making actors in order to safeguard their respective institutional interests. Instead, third-party intervention needs to be seen as a neutral undertaking and not an extension of a particular institutional or personal agenda. The solution here would be to get compliance from key stakeholders not to launch their own third-party intervention without continuous coordination with other related peace-making efforts.
- e) Lastly, there is a need to tackle this complex and long lasting conflict from a regional point of view. It is not only a conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Greece and Turkey are very much part of this conflict consequently they must also be part of the solution. Greece, Turkey and both sides of Cyprus depend largely on trade with the EU. It might be in the interest of the EU to provide substantial assistance to the region for the sake of trade, economic development and political stability. If the US could afford a Marshall Plan for Western Europe after the second World War, why could the EU, seconded by EFTA, not do the same for the Southern Eastern Mediterranean region provided all parties concerned agree to do business with each other instead of war?

COMPETENCE PREQUISITES OF THIRD-PARTY EXPERTS ATTEMPTING TO BRING RESOLUTION TO A MALIGNANT AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CONFLICT.

Attempting to bring resolution to complex conflicts such as the Cyprus conflict requires different competencies of the intervening third-party actor, be this a representative of an official institution or an NGO. As exemplified by the case analysis described and analysed above, solutions are neither easy to find nor gain approval by the disputant parties. Too much is at stake and that includes the external stakeholders' geopolitical and economic interests and strategies.

Time, perseverance, conflict know-how and cross-cultural competence are of essence as well as safeguarding continuous multi-stakeholder institutional commitment in order to avoid failure and premature abandonment of a third-party intervention. In particular, the following competencies might be required to sustain a commitment to the intervention despite multiple and inevitable failures over time, namely:

- a) Third-party intervention experts have to find a way to balance short-term and long-term strategies and to avoid focusing too much either on mitigation of a humanitarian crisis or on long-term solution generation. Both goals have to be addressed as seen needed. This in turn requires an ability to continuously shift gears back and forth so to speak from a short-term humanitarian to a longterm developmental focus. As observed by Fred Tanner (2000: 558):

The humanitarian organizations cannot escape the debate about conflict-solving versus humanitarian relief, and the agenda of States pursuing geopolitical objectives may not be compatible with humanitarian efforts of international organizations and NGOs. Too close an association with regional powers or contact groups may lead to the loss of credibility of humanitarian organizations, especially if the formal peace process turns sour.

- b) Malignant conflicts most often outlast third-party actors because funds have been depleted, professionals got re-assigned to new responsibilities or third-party institutions have lost their mandate or decided to end their intervention due to lack of visible progress. Time at disposal of the third-party expert is limited as is the range and depth of solutions which could be generated and implemented.

Faced with such limitations of time, mandate and resources many third-party experts try to achieve some tangible results within these limitations. They might more easily focus on practical, hands-on problem solving methods, forgetting that either most have been tried already or that external and internal stakeholder interests will sooner or later undo short-term progress. What is needed instead is a shift from problem solving to managing dilemmas and to tolerate longterm ambiguities. Experts have to learn to support their clients, in this case parties to the conflict, without falling into the trap of actively participating in or even proposing concrete solutions to the problem, of attending to the conflict without aiming at eradicating it with premature solutions (For more on this shift of consulting focus, see Saner, 1999).

- c) The sight of human suffering, anxiety, and uncertainties are known to be sources of stress for the third-party experts as well as for the conflicting parties. This general condition is further aggravated by emotional tensions typical of inter-ethnic conflicts, especially those characterized as malignant and intransigent. Glen Fisher (1998: 59) defines intransigence in this context of inter-ethnic conflict as follows:

Intransigence, then, is to be expected when these building blocks of deep culture are challenged. Culture seeks consistency, it rejects that which disturbs consistency even when the proposal seems well reasoned and objective to the mediator.

The Cyprus conflict has brought to the foreground intense ethnic hatred and suspicion, which inevitably play out at the negotiation tables. While many experienced third-party experts know how to cope with intense ethnic hatred, an additional factor has to be addressed in a multi-stakeholder conflict: shifting allegiance. External stakeholders will shift positions, drop coalition partners and desist from promises if national interests are at stake.

Faced with sudden loss of support from important external stakeholders, third-party experts need to understand and anticipate this factor. Shifting of allegiances becomes increasingly likely the longer a third-party expert is engaged in the conflict resolution process, and therefore, the closer he might be getting to an implementable resolution. For the third-party expert, experiencing sudden withdrawal of support from external stakeholders might trigger sense of deception, disillusionment and could even lead to a questioning of deeply-held values (See Saner, 1990).

CONCLUSIONS

The Cyprus conflict persists despite many years of effort to bring a closure to this long-lasting inter-ethnic conflict. To bring about the right mix of incentives and sanctions as described above

seems very unlikely in the near future, hence the chances to bring about a peaceful reconciliation on the island are not high. The opportunity to mend fences between the two communities seems to have been lost. Both sides link concessions to requests, which both sides are not willing or able to make at this point. For instance, Southern Cypriot officials reject accusations of acting recklessly by pointing out that as long as Turkish troops remain stationed on the island, their security is not guaranteed. Since history shows that no country other than Greece would support them, they argue, they have to install the missile system in self defence. At the same time, Southern Cyprus officials state that they would be willing to consider applying any peaceful solutions of co-existence with Northern Cyprus if Turkey would do the same for its Kurdish minority. In light of the current entrenched fighting between Kurdish rebels and Turkish armed forces and in light of Turkey's tough policies towards the Kurdish separatists, such a linking--even though appealing--seems unlikely, at least in the near future. Hence, in the absence of compromise, the threat of armed confrontation on the island remains.

Building trust between old enemies takes time. Without trust and cooperation, deeply held fears and entrenched demonization of the other community cannot be brought down to more realistic levels. As long as the conflict lasts, both sides' establishments can continue to write new chapters in their seemingly endless history books and nurture oral legends depicting the other community as negatively as they can in order to make sure that this conflict will not be resolved in this lifetime.

Establishing countries based on ethnic and religious identity is an anachronism which unfortunately has come back to haunt us in many parts of the world, most notably in the Balkans. The situation on Cyprus is particularly unfortunate since both sides are dependent on their respective motherlands for military, economic and cultural support. Both motherlands are embroiled in their own struggle for political stability and economic development. Greece and Turkey have had periods of authoritarian rule and disrespect for human rights. Public security is also challenged in both countries by occasional violent bomb attacks committed by extremist groups. They are not necessarily in a position to offer either more security or better economic conditions for their respective "relatives" on the island.

Instead of depending on support from their mother countries, Southern and Northern Cyprus could lead the way in creating a viable form of cohabitation based on mutual accommodation and respect. Europe and the Near East need stability and success stories of cooperation across the ethnic-religious divide. Economic cooperation has existed before and continues to exist between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Greece and Turkey, yet the forces trying to stop trade and commercial ties are numerous on all sides (See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1998). Comparing the industries of Turkey and Greece, Oz and Konsolas (1996) concluded that both countries have undergone profound changes: Turkey through its substantial trade liberalization policies starting in the early 1980s and Greece through its substantial adaptation measures due to the need to comply with the *acquis communautaire* subsequent to the entry into the EU. The similarities outweigh the differences in both countries' industrial structures. However, similarities do not necessarily mean continuous fierce competition for limited resources. Getting equal access to the large EU market would help both countries' economies diversify and develop market niches based on comparative advantages, thus avoiding continued competition between similar products.

A market opening and regional development initiative by the EU could offer benefits for all parties concerned, limit and ideally reduce the wasteful investment in armament and national defence and offer opportunities to build confidence through mutually beneficial economic cooperation which, over time, would bring about mutual acceptance and co-existence. After all, key EU member countries contributed to the current situation. France supported entry of Greece

into the EU and the start of negotiations with Cyprus. Britain has been the former colonial ruler and current user of extraterritorial military bases. Germany has been vocal in keeping Turkey out of membership negotiations and most of the other EU member states are trade partners of the region. They all should have a stake in supporting peaceful co-existence in this part of the world. The armed conflict between NATO and Serbia should be a reminder that inaction does not necessarily reduce tension nor guarantee peace.

It would be of great relief to see the old enemies, Greece and Turkey, become reasonable neighbours in the interest of their own future and that of the whole region, including the EU, the Balkans and the Near Eastern regions. In other words, it would be comforting to know that the graveyard of “well-intentioned conflict resolution experts on Cyprus” can be closed. May this case report contribute to the end of the Cyprus conflict and to the beginning of reasoned cooperation among all peoples of different religious and ethnic backgrounds, which often share surprisingly similar customs and habits.

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Annex A

	SOUTHERN CYPRUS	NORTHERN CYPRUS
Basic Statistics (approximations since most statistics are contested by both sides, differentiated by areas controlled by respective administrations north or south of the UN controlled Green Line)	Republic of Cyprus, recognized by United Nations	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognized by Turkey only)
Surface area of total island (km2.)	9251 Km2	3355 Km2 (37% of total Cyprus)
Population - Citizens (est. total 1997*), Northern Cyprus does not include ca. 40,000 settlers from Turkey and ca. 8,000 students from various countries; Southern Cyprus does not include ca. 22,000 foreigners from different countries)	630,000 (excl. ca. 500,000 living abroad)	160,000 (excl. ca. 200,000 living abroad)
Population growth rate	1.1 %	1.5 %
Urban population	53 %	n.a.-
Literacy rate	99 %	n.a.-
GDP per capita in US\$ (1997)	14,400.--	4,800.-
Economy	mixed	large public sector
Inflation (1998)	3 %	100+%
Monetary Unit	Cyprus Pound	Turkish Lira
Structure of production:		
— Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing	14.6 %	27.6 %
— Industry	20.41 %	11.3 %
— Construction	9.2 %	10.5 %
— Trade & Tourism	23.7 %	9.4 %
— Country & Public Services	20.4 %	22.4 %
— Finance, Transport, etc.	11.6 %	19 %
Unemployment (1998)	3%	n.a.
Armed Forces (est. 1998)		
Troops (Greek Cypriot vs Turkish Cypriot)	10,000	3,000
(of which conscripts)	(8,700)	n.a.
Reserves	88,000	26,000
Foreign Troops (Greek vs Turkish Armies)	4,000	30,000
Battles tanks?	143	265
1180 United Nations Peacekeeping troops		
5,000 British military personnel		
Government	Republic	Republic
Religion	Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Muslim	Sunni Muslim, small Maronite minority
Ethnic composition		
— Greek Cypriot	98 %	473
— Turkish Cypriot	325	99 %
— Other	Russians, Lebanese etc.	Lebanese

Legend: GCC = Greek Cypriot Community, TCC = Turkish Cypriot Community, UN = United Nations

Sources: The European, 6 April 1998, Financial Times, 7 June 1994 & 6 April 1998, and Fischer Weltalmanach, Frankfurt. 1997

¹ Even though openly in favor of many positions put forward by Northern Cyprus, Dodd (1999) offers a very good summary of previous attempts at conflict resolution on Cyprus.

² Within the period of 1964-1994, the United Nations passed 17 statements and letters by the UN Secretary General, 93 Security Council Resolutions, 13 UN General Assembly resolutions, 6 UN reports by the Commission on Human Rights (Source: "Resolutions Adopted by the UN on Cyprus Problem," published by the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia)

The Institute of Multi-Tack Diplomacy (IMTD), Washington DC, and the Conflict Management Group (CMG), Cambridge Mass, joint forces under the name "Cyprus Consortium" to implement a training program in Cyprus focusing on conflict resolution, to build trust relationships and to demonstrate to their communities the potential for cooperation between the two sides of the conflict. (Notter, J, McDonald, J, 1998)³

⁴ From the perspective of many Southern Cyprus officials, the UN was keeping peace but not making peace. The presence of UNFICYP prevented an outbreak of new violence but indirectly sanctioned the occupation of parts of Cyprus by Turkish armed forces. From the perspective of many Northern Cyprus officials, the UN failed to protect the Turkish minorities in 1960-1974 and through its refusal to extend political recognition to Northern Cyprus, the UN failed to act as a neutral third party.

⁵ Distinction needs to be made according to de iure and de facto use of terminology. According to UN practice, the Republic of Cyprus is the legitimate government representing the whole of the island while the TRNC has been declared legally invalid by the United Nations (Resolutions Nr. 541 (1983) and Nr. 550 (1984)). The authors acknowledge the existing legal distinctions but for the sake of clarity and editorial expediency, de iure and de facto titles and denominations will be abstracted to Southern Cyprus (controlled by Republic of Cyprus) and Northern Cyprus (controlled by Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), and titles of heads of governments simplified to leader of Greek Cypriots (Mr. Clerides) and leader of Turkish Cypriots (Mr. Denktash).

⁶ Turkey and Greece have been reported to have received in 1992-93 alone 2,822 tanks, 1,084 armored combat vehicles, 303 large caliber artillery systems, 28 attack helicopters and 14 warships (source: Financial Times, 7 June 1994); in addition it was reported that the Clinton administration notified Congress of plans to deliver 14 frigates to Turkey and 11 frigates to Greece over the next two years in a package of sales and give-aways worth approximately \$250 million (Source: International Herald Tribune, 3 July 1998)

⁷ A stalemate based on the insights of the game theory strategem of the prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod, 1985) which states that cooperation might be more realistically possible once both parties to a conflict realize that a win/lose strategy would start a mutually destructive lose/lose war. This strategem however is based on the assumption that players are conducting decision-making processes based on logical and reasonable cost-benefit analysis, an assumption which requires the control of emotional behavior which most observers of the region do not take for granted.

⁸ Hardy and Phillips (1998: 218) observed that dominant stakeholders may want to ensure that the domain definition does not change. Domain being defined as processes of social construction and meaning creation wherein social order is being negotiated by key stakeholders.

⁹ See Boatswain and Nicolson (1989) which describes the historical misgivings held by many Greeks based on the period of Greece's rule by the Ottoman empire.

¹⁰ Turkish Daily News, Jan. 31, 2002, "General Ozkok defines solution in Cyprus",

¹¹ Fareed Zakaria, "The Fears of America's Steadfast Muslim Ally", Newsweek, 28 January 2002, p.5